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TREATY-BASED CLAIMS AGAINST 
SUBDIVISIONS OF ICSID CONTRACTING 
STATES 
DOUGLAS PIVNICHNY

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article primarily concerns the juridical personality of States in 
public international law, how this has changed in the 20th century, and 
potential consequences of these developments in the field of investor-State 
arbitration. Specifically, it asks whether a subdivision of a federal State 
made subject to the jurisdiction of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID” or “the Centre”) under 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention
1
 may be responsible as a juridical 
person independent of its State for violating an investment treaty (e.g., a 
bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) or the investment chapter of a free-
trade agreement (“FTA”)) to which that State is party.2 
Under Article 25(1) of the ICSID convention, the Centre’s jurisdiction 
extends to “any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State.”3 In addition to this designation 
requirement, under Article 25(3), “[c]onsent by a constituent subdivision 
or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State” 
unless the State notifies the Centre that it waives this right.
4
 Once 
designated, a subdivision becomes a potential respondent in a claim 
brought by an investor before the Centre. One UNCITRAL tribunal noted 
while finding it lacked jurisdiction over a State subdivision the 
 
 
  B.A. (Hons), Oxon.; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis; MIL. Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies. The present article was adapted from the author’s masters 
dissertation. Thanks are due to Professor Joost Pauwelyn for his supervision and Professor Zachary 
Douglas for serving as second reader for the dissertation. The author additionally thanks Manuel Cases 
for his insightful comments on a draft version of this article and Professor Leila Sadat and the Whitney 
R. Harris World Law Institute for their generous support. The views expressed and any mistakes made 
in this article are exclusively the author’s.  
 1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]. 
 2. This article will generically use the term BIT to refer to such treaties as most of them are 
BITs proper. For the present purposes, the distinction between BIT, free trade agreement investment 
chapter, and other instruments (e.g., the Energy Charter Treaty) is immaterial. 
 3. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1). For the purposes of this article, the word 
“subdivision” will be used to mean “constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State” within 
the sense of art. 25(1).  
 4. Id. art. 25(3). 
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exceptionality of this provision.
5
 This opens the questions of whether a 
claim might be successfully brought against such a subdivision for 
violating an investor’s rights under a BIT despite the State’s responsibility 
for its subdivision’s acts. 
One can imagine this becoming of practical relevance in situations 
involving subdivisions of federal States with considerable resources held 
in their own right under domestic law, making the subdivision an enticing 
respondent. Examples of such subdivisions currently designated to ICSID 
are the Canadian provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario.
6
 
Each of these have substantial land holdings. For example, approximately 
60% of Alberta is Crown land, belonging to the province in its sovereign 
capacity.
7
 Furthermore, each of these provinces owns the natural resources 
on their territory.
8
 A claimant seeking to attach minerals in these Crown 
lands to satisfy an award is better off with an award against the province 
than against Canada itself. Australia’s position is similar, as five of its 
states, the Northern Territory, and the Australian Capital Territory are also 
designated respondents.
9
 Similarly to Canadian provinces, Australian 
states typically either own minerals because they exist on Crown lands or 
because the mineral ownership was reserved when the rest of a formerly 
Crown parcel was first conveyed to private hands.
10
 By focusing on the 
application of BIT standards to subdivisions, this article aims to show that 
claims against these subdivisions, and thus pursuing their independent 
assets, are possible. 
But this is also of practical relevance to the Contracting States 
themselves. Traditionally, and as reflected in the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC’s) influential Articles on the Responsibility of States 
 
 
 5. Mytilineos v. Serbia and Montenegro, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 173 (Sept. 8, 2006) 
(“Claims against sub-State entities or constituent parts of a State party to an investment agreement are 
only exceptionally permissible.”). 
 6. Designations by Contracting States Regarding Constituent Subdivisions or Agencies, at 2, 
Doc. No. ICSID/8-C (May 2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID 
8ContractingStatesandMeasuresTakenbyThemforthePurposeoftheConvention.pdf. 
 7. ALBERTA GOVERNMENT, HANDBOOK OF INSTRUMENTS PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LANDS ACT & 
PUBLIC LAND ADMINISTRATION REGULATION (PLAR) 6 (Feb. 26, 2013), http://aep.alberta.ca/lands-
forests/public-lands-administration-regulation/documents/PLARHandbookInstruments-Feb19-2014A. 
pdf.  
 8. DWIGHT NEWMAN, NATURAL RESOURCE JURISDICTION IN CANADA 59 (2013); see also 
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5, § 109 
(Can.).  
 9. Designations by Contracting States, supra note 6, at 1.  
 10. Michael Crommelin, Federal-State Cooperation on Natural Resources: The Australian 
Experience, in MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES IN A FEDERAL STATE 296 (J. Owen Saunders ed., 
1986). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/7
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for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), the actions of subdivisions 
of States are attributable to the respective State as a consequence of the 
formers’ status as State organs.11 Central governments have expressed 
discomfort with their liability for the internationally wrongful treatment of 
foreign investors by subdivisions acting within their exclusive policy 
competence.
12
 Direct investor claims against subdivisions offer the 
potential to cut out the central government as middleman when the 
subdivision itself is, in fact, the author of the wrongful treatment and 
remove a need for domestic mechanisms to appropriately assign liability 
to subdivisions. 
To successfully claim under a BIT against a subdivision, an investor 
will need to show that the BIT is applicable law opposable to the 
subdivision. This article will address two mechanisms for achieving this.
13
 
Under Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, both “the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute” and “such rules of international law 
as may be applicable” are applicable in the absence of the parties’ 
agreement as to applicable law.
14
  
This article will first briefly address the possibility of the application of 
a BIT to a subdivision by an ICSID tribunal as applicable domestic law. 
At issue here is not the juridical personality of the subdivision, which 
typically exists in the domestic law of the parent States. Instead, the 
threshold question will be whether the applicable domestic law has 
incorporated the substantive standards in the BIT. 
The primary focus of this article will be the application of the BIT as 
such, an instrument creating obligations of public international law. This 
raises two questions. First, is a subdivision of a State a person in 
international law capable of being responsible for its violation? Second, if 
a subdivision has international legal personality, are treaties into which its 
 
 
 11. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l 
Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 4(1) (2001) [hereinafter “ARSIWA”]; see JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 547–48 (8th ed. 2012); see also Compañiá de Aguas del 
Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 49 (Nov. 21, 2000) 
(“Under international law . . . it is well established that actions of a political subdivision of a federal 
state . . . are attributable to the central government.”). 
 12. Charles-Emmanuel Coté, Toward Arbitration Between Subnational Units and Foreign 
Investors?, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 145, Apr. 13, 2015. It a subdivision’s exclusive policy 
competences within a federal context that makes federal subdivisions particularly interesting. These 
are cases where the parent State, while responsible on the international plane, has limited options to 
control the subdivision’s behavior ex ante. For this reason, this dissertation limits itself to questions of 
federal subdivisions. 
 13. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1). 
 14. Id. 
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parent State enters opposable to it? This article will show that the answer 
to both of these questions is positive by examining doctrinal sources, 
ICSID practice, and the drafting history of the ICSID Convention. It will 
additionally consider as analogies other internationalized fora where State 
organs have a measure of juridical personality and have been held 
responsible for violations of international law, particularly the 
international criminal tribunals.
15
 
In order to concentrate on the application of BIT standards to 
subdivisions, this article will not address some other questions relevant to 
a successful treaty-based ICSID claim against a subdivision. The first of 
these is the question of designation. Under Article 25(1), a subdivision 
may only be a respondent if its parent Contracting State has designated it 
as a potential respondent to the Centre.
16
 As noted above, some 
Contracting States, like Australia and Canada, have designated some of 
their federal subdivisions as ICSID respondents. Others, like the United 
States and Switzerland, have not.
17
 Some, like the United Kingdom, have 
designated their colonies administered separately from their metropolitan 
territory, like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda.
18
 The designation itself 
raises issues of whether the procedural form of designation is effective and 
whether the entity designated is a subdivision or agency within the 
meaning of Article 25(1).
19
 These questions can be complex. For example, 
in Niko Resources v. Bangladesh, the Tribunal held that Contracting States 
can implicitly designate an agency by allowing the agency to conclude a 
contract with an ICSID arbitration clause.
20
 This article presumes that a 
given subdivision is capable of designation and has been effectively 
designated to the Centre. 
Additionally, this article will not discuss the process of securing a 
subdivision’s consent to ICSID arbitration. In treaty-based disputes, 
consent to arbitration is generally established through a State’s offer to 
 
 
 15. The legal order of the European Union also provides an interesting example that can be 
interpreted as holding non-State persons responsible for violations of treaty, or treaty-based norms. 
This dissertation will not employ the European Union as an example in light of the continuing 
disagreement as to whether EU law is international law. 
 16. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1). 
 17. Designations by Contracting States, supra note 6.  
 18. Id. 
 19. See Inna Uchkunova & Oleg Temnikov, Untying the Knot: Estoppel and Implicit 
Designation of a Constituent Subdivision or Agency under the ICSID Convention, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Sept. 4, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/09/04/untying-the-knot-
estoppel-and-implicit-designation-of-a-constituent-subdivision-or-agency-under-the-icsid-convention/.  
 20. Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case Nos. 
ARB/10/11 & ARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 301–02 (Aug. 19, 2013); Uchkunova & 
Temnikov, supra note 19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/7
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arbitrate in the treaty and the investor’s acceptance by bringing a claim.21 
The challenge this presents in an investor-subdivision context is that such 
treaties generally do not provide for the subdivision’s consent as an 
independent legal person. For example, Article 28(1) of the 2004 
Canadian Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(“Model FIPA”) provides that “[e]ach Party consents to the submission of 
a claim to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this 
Agreement.”22 This provision would establish Canada’s consent to 
investor claims under the Model FIPA and is generally reflected in 
subsequent Canadian BITs.
23
 But it does not speak to the consent of a 
Canadian province to such arbitration. Similarly, although Australia has no 
Model BIT, its BITs in force tend not suggest the consent of its states to 
arbitration.
24
 Although this problem is an important one in the context of 
BIT claims against subdivisions, it remains one for another day. 
Finally, this article will assume that neither BITs nor any relevant 
agreements to arbitrate specify the BIT as applicable law in an investor-
subdivision arbitration. Under Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, the 
law that the parties agree is applicable is applicable.
25
 It seems 
straightforward that if the parties to a dispute agree that a BIT provides the 
substantive rules of decision, it does.
26
 However, as Gaillard and 
Banifatemi note, “a very large number of BITs do not provide for any 
 
 
 21. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 257–58 (2d ed. 2012); see Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 
¶ 12.3 (Sept. 16, 2003) (“[I]t is firmly established that an investor can accept a State’s offer of ICSID 
arbitration contained in a bilateral investment treaty by instituting ICSID proceedings.”). 
 22. Agreement between Canada and ____________ for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments art. 28(1), INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian 
2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) [hereinafter “Canadian Model FIPA”]; see also 
Céline Lévesque & Andrew Newcombe, Canada, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 111 (Chester Brown ed., 2013). The text of the Canadian Model FIPA is also 
reprinted in id. at 62–128. It is also available upon request from Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development Canada. Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT CANADA (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.international. 
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipa-apie.aspx?lang=eng. 
 23. Lévesque & Newcombe, supra note 22, at 111. 
 24. E.g., Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine 
Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 13(1)(b), [1997] ATS 4; Agreement 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of Romania on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments art. 9(1)-(2), [1994] ATS 10; Agreement between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of Indonesia concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
art. XI(1)-(2), [1993] ATS 19. 
 25. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1) (“The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties.”).  
 26. Cf. Asian Agri. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, 
¶ 24 (June 27, 1990). 
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choice of law.”27 Thus, this article will confine itself to the more common 
(and interesting) case where no applicable law has been agreed by the 
parties. 
II. HISTORY OF ARTICLE 25(1): THE INCLUSION OF SUBDIVISIONS IN THE 
ICSID CONVENTION 
As a starting point, the drafting history of Article 25(1) offers insights 
into the importance of both legal personality and opposability of legal 
rules to explaining the possibility of ICSID claims against State 
subdivisions. Throughout the drafting process, concerns over the privity of 
contract doctrine as applied to State agencies signing agreements with 
foreign investors led to the inclusion of the provision. These concerns 
reflect an awareness of the drafters that legal persons other than 
Contracting States could become involved in investment disputes, that 
agreements with persons other than Contracting States might not bind 
those States, and that disputes involving such questions might nevertheless 
be appropriate to include in the Centre’s jurisdiction. Beyond this however 
also emerges an awareness that Article 25(1) might have broader effects 
on the international legal personality of agencies and subdivisions in the 
ICSID context. 
The Drafting of the ICSID Convention by the World Bank proceeded 
in several stages.
28
 The compiled preparatory works of the ICSID 
Convention identify five draft texts.
29
 The first was a Working Paper in 
the Form of a Draft Convention (“Working Paper”) submitted to the 
Bank’s Executive Directors by General Counsel in 1962.30 In August 
1963, the Bank’s staff submitted a new First Preliminary Draft to the 
 
 
 27. Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second 
Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law 
Process, 18 ICSID REV. 375, 379 (2003). 
 28. See generally Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter “Formulation of the Convention”], in 
CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF 
OTHER STATES: ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE 
CONVENTION 2–10 (1970) [hereinafter “I ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS”]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Working Paper in the form of a Draft Convention prepared by the General Counsel and 
transmitted to the Executive Directors [hereinafter “Working Paper”], in II-1 INT’L CENTER FOR THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION 
OF THE CONVENTION 19 (1968) [hereinafter “II-1 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS”]; Formulation of the 
Convention, in I ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 28, at 4.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/7
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Executive Directors.
31
 The First Preliminary Draft was quickly 
superseded by a slightly revised Preliminary Draft prepared for 
consideration at four Consultative Meetings of Legal Experts on the 
convention.
32
 In 1964, after these Consultative Meetings and consideration 
by the Bank’s Executive Directors and Board of Governors, the staff 
prepared a working paper including a draft convention (“First Draft”).33 A 
specially convened Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment 
Disputes considered the First Draft and government comments.
34
 In 
December 1964 and as a result of this work, the Legal Committee reported 
a Revised Draft to the Bank’s Executive Directors.35 On the basis of the 
Revised Draft, the Executive Directors approved a text of the Convention 
for submission to the Bank’s Members in March 1965.36 
Reference in Article 25(1) of subdivisions of States was added to the 
ICSID Convention in the First Draft and refined in the Second Draft. 
Earlier drafts refer only to disputes “between a Contracting State and a 
national of another Contracting State.”37 The idea of extending the 
jurisdiction of the Centre to subdivisions of States first emerged during the 
consideration of the Preliminary Draft at the regional Consultative 
Meetings of legal experts. In the third session of the meeting at Addis 
Ababa, an expert from Tanganyika asked whether the words “Contracting 
State” included statutory and public-owned corporations, which he noted 
were often the contractual counterparties of foreign investors in African 
 
 
 31. First Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter “First Preliminary Draft”], in II-1 ICSID 
PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 133; Formulation of the Convention, in I ICSID 
PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 28, at 4. The Article-by-Article Analysis in the compiled 
preparatory works generally does not address this draft, referring instead of the subsequent Preliminary 
Draft, infra note 32, that shortly followed it. See Article-by-Article Analysis, in I ICSID 
PREPARATORY NOTES, supra note 28, at 12. Accordingly, the First Preliminary Draft will be omitted 
from present consideration. 
 32. Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter “Preliminary Draft”], in II-1 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, 
supra note 30, at 184; Formulation of the Convention, in I ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 
28, at 6.  
 33. Draft Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States [hereinafter “First Draft”], in II-1 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 610; 
Formulation of the Convention, in I ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 28, at 6–8.  
 34. Formulation of the Convention, in I ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 28, at 8. 
 35. Revised Draft of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter “Revised Draft”], in II-2 INT’L CENTER FOR THE 
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION 
OF THE CONVENTION 911 (1968) [hereinafter “II-2 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS”]; Formulation of the 
Convention, in I ICSID Preparatory Works, supra note 28, at 8. 
 36. Formulation of the Convention, in I ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 28, at 8–10. 
 37. Working Paper, supra note 30, art. II(1); Preliminary Draft, supra note 32, art. II(1).  
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States.
38
 Aron Broches, chairperson of the meeting and General Counsel of 
the Bank, replied that the meaning of “Contracting State” was meant to be 
straightforward but that the point raised was important.
39
  
The question raised by the expert from Tanganyika resurfaced at the 
other Consultative Meetings. For example, in the third session of the 
meetings in Santiago, an expert from Jamaica raised the question of 
extending the Centre’s jurisdiction to statutory corporations.40 An 
Australian expert raised similar concerns with respect to capital-importing 
States with federal systems in the first meeting in Bangkok.
41
 In Bangkok, 
the extension of the Centre’s jurisdiction received explicit support from 
experts from Kuwait, Pakistan, and Australia.
42
 
Experts at the Consultative Meetings also raised doubts about the need 
to extend the Centre’s jurisdiction to subdivisions. For example, in the 
fourth meeting in Geneva, an expert from the Federal Republic of 
Germany questioned whether Contracting States might allow subdivisions 
to be respondents in an effort to avoid their own responsibility.
43
 While 
Broches replied explaining that the provision was intended to extend the 
Centre’s jurisdiction to State corporations entering into investment 
agreements with foreign investors, the German expert was not 
convinced.
44
 Similarly, in the third meeting at Bangkok, two Indian 
experts questioned the usefulness of extending the Centre’s jurisdiction.45  
The concerns raised in the consultative meetings were reflected in the 
Staff’s First Draft. Article 26(1) of the First Draft provided in relevant 
part: 
The jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to all legal disputes 
between a Contracting State (or one of its political subdivisions or 
agencies) and a national of another Contracting State. . . .
46
 
 
 
 38. Summary Record of Proceedings, Addis Ababa Consultative Meetings, in II-1 ICSID 
PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 258. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Summary Record of Proceedings, Santiago Consultative Meetings, in II-1 ICSID 
PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 321.  
 41. Summary Record of Proceedings, Bangkok Consultative Meetings, in II-1 ICSID 
PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 473–74. 
 42. Id. at 500, 502, 551. 
 43. Summary Record of Proceedings, Geneva Consultative Meetings, in II-1 ICSID 
PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 410. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Summary Record of Proceedings, Bangkok Consultative Meetings, supra note 41, at 504, 
507.  
 46. First Draft, supra note 33, art. 26(1). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/7
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The Staff’s comment notes that the change would expand the jurisdiction 
of the Centre to extend to political subdivisions or agencies of a 
Contracting State.
47
 This text would form the basis of further discussions 
of the Convention by the legal committee of the Bank’s Executive 
Directors. 
The first State response to the text of the First Draft was a letter from 
the Ministry of Finance of the Malagasy Republic.
48
 In the letter, the 
Malagasy Republic raises two distinct concerns with the expansion of the 
Centre’s jurisdiction. The first was interference with States’ domestic 
affairs. As the Malagasy Republic noted, “[b]y providing that dispute 
involving [subdivisions] could be submitted to the Center, one runs the 
risk of extending the jurisdiction of the Center to controversies which 
should rather be solved at the strictly municipal level.”49 While 
recognizing that Contracting States would be entitled to refuse such 
jurisdiction, the Malagasy Republic argued that refusals of such consent 
might damage confidence in the Convention.
50
 
The second Malagasy concern raised first addressed the issues of 
international legal personality created by the Centre’s jurisdiction.51 In the 
view of the Malagasy Republic, “this principle, to the extent that it grants 
political subdivisions and agencies an international personality, it is in 
conflict with the concept of Malagasy public law that the juridical 
personality granted to political subdivisions and agencies is a personality 
under municipal law and not international law. At the international level, 
only the State can represent them.”52 This concern was echoed by the 
Brazilian member of the Legal Committee in written comments on the 
First Draft, which specifically object to the extension of the Centre’s 
jurisdiction to subdivisions because of their lack of international 
independent legal personality.
53
 
These concerns were not specifically addressed by the other members 
of the Legal Committee in their discussions of the First Draft.
54
 The 
 
 
 47. Id. art. 26, comment. 
 48. Letter addressed to the Bank by the Ministry of Finance of the Malagasy Republic on 
November 7, 1964 [hereinafter “Malagasy Letter”], in II-2 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 
30, at 657.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Comments by Mr. da Cunha (Brazil) on Chapter II, in II-2 ICISD PREPARATORY WORKS, 
supra note 30, at 838. 
 54. See Summary of Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, Dec. 9, Afternoon 
[hereinafter “December 9 Summary”], in II-2 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 856–57; 
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Working Group assigned to consider the question focused instead on the 
words to be used to extend jurisdiction to subdivisions, seeking “to cover 
as wide a range of entities as possible using terminology which could be 
universally understood.”55 Two proposals for the text emerged from the 
Working Group.
56
 The members from Australia and India recommended 
language including “a constituent subdivision, such as a State, Republic or 
Province, of a Contracting State, or any agency of a Contracting State that 
had been designated to the Center by the Contracting State.”57 The 
member from Tanzania recommended instead “any body or bodies 
designated in that behalf by that Contracting State.”58 In response to the 
Working Group Interim Report, the Legal Committee determined that the 
condition of the Contracting State’s consent should apply to both 
subdivisions and agencies.
59
 The Committee additionally decided to adopt 
the Australian/Indian text, but without the clarifying text referring to 
States, republics, and provinces.
60
 This decision resulted in the final text of 
the provision, as is reflected in the subsequent Fourth Interim Report of 
the Drafting Committee and the text of the Convention.
61
 
The drafting history of Article 25(1) reveals two interesting points 
about the purpose and meaning of the provision. The first concerns the 
purpose of the expanded jurisdiction. At the core of States’ concerns in 
allowing subdivisions to be respondents was the privity of contract 
doctrine. Generally, contracts create obligations between the parties 
thereto.
62
 The drafting history reveals concern among negotiators that a 
Centre without jurisdiction over subdivisions would be unable to hear 
claims based on contracts between investors and those subdivisions.
63
 This 
concern was prescient. Multiple ICSID panels have held themselves to be 
without jurisdiction over claims against States arising from contracts with 
 
 
Interim Report on Parenthetical Clause in Article 26(1) [hereinafter “Working Group Interim Report”], 
in II-2 ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 867. 
 55. Working Group Interim Report, supra note 54, at 867. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. December 9 Summary, supra note 54, at 857. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Fourth Interim Report, in II ICSID PREPARATORY WORKS, supra note 30, at 879; ICSID 
Convention art. 25(1) (“[O]r any constitution subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated 
to the Centre by that State”). 
 62. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary Objections, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 112 (July 22); 
c.f. JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1996). 
 63. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
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subdivisions.
64
 For example, Cable Television of Nevis v. Federation of St. 
Christopher (St. Kitts) & Nevis concerned allegations of the violation of an 
investment agreement between an investor and the administration of Nevis 
Island, a federal subdivision of St. Kitts & Nevis.
65
  St. Kitts & Nevis 
objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the claimant’s 
dispute was with Nevis and Nevis was not a designated constituent 
subdivision.
66
 Because designation and the Federation’s consent were 
lacking and because the claim was against Nevis, the tribunal held itself 
without jurisdiction.
67
 Had Nevis been a designated subdivision, the 
Centre would have been competent to adjudicate the investor’s claim 
against it. The final text of Article 25(1) offers this possibility.  
The second is the recognition in the Malagasy and Brazilian comments 
that extending the Centre’s jurisdiction sat uncomfortably with traditional 
notions of international legal personality. Both reflect a conception that 
States are and should be the only legal persons on the international plane.
68
 
The Malagasy Letter reflects a fear that extending the jurisdiction of the 
Centre to subdivisions and agencies would create a new category of legal 
personality, the creation of  which the Malagasy Republic seemed to 
oppose for policy reasons.
69
 The Brazilian comments reflect a slightly 
different position, that it is impossible for a subdivision to be a legal 
person in international law.
70
 As will be examined below,
71
 these fears are 
consistent with the then-developing position that a treaty can extend legal 
personality to new entities and with a concern that Article 25(1) could 
include subdivisions among them. 
III. APPLYING A BIT TO A SUBDIVISION AS DOMESTIC LAW 
Having reviewed the origins of ICSID jurisdiction over subdivisions, 
this article now turns to possibilities to use this jurisdiction to bring BIT-
based claims against them. As noted above, this article assumes a lack of 
 
 
 64. E.g., Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 216, (Apr. 22, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 245 (2007); Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Royaume 
de Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Décision sur la compétence, ¶¶ 68–69 (July 16, 2001); Cable 
Television of Nevis Ltd. v. Federation of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) & Nevis, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/95/2, Award, ¶ 2.22 (Dec. 16, 1996), 5 ICSID Rep. 108 (2002). 
 65. Cable Television of Nevis, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, ¶ 2.09. 
 66. Id. ¶ 2.01. 
 67. Id. ¶ 2.33. 
 68. Malagasy Letter, supra note 48, at 657; Comments by Mr. da Cunha, supra note 53, at 838. 
 69. Malagasy Letter, supra note 48, at 657. 
 70. Comments by Mr. da Cunha, supra note 53, at 838. 
  71. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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choice-of-law provision in the relevant BIT.
72
 The default applicable law 
provision in Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention governs in such 
cases.
73
 Article 42 of the ICSID convention enshrines a dualist conception 
of law.  It provides that, in the absence of an agreement of the parties on 
applicable law, a “Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable.”74 The distinction in this 
text between the law of Contracting States and international law implies 
the existence of two separate legal orders in which applicable norms might 
exist. Rules finding their source in treaties can exist both on the 
international and domestic levels. This chapter briefly addresses the 
possible application of a BIT to a subdivision of a State as part of that 
State’s domestic law. It will also address the drawbacks of this theory of 
subdivision responsibility for BIT violations. Particularly, as Chinkin 
notes, this theory of responsibility is limited by the fact that “[d]ifferences 
in municipal law prevent any overall conclusions.”75 
Article 42 of the ICSID Convention enshrines the domestic law of the 
respondent Contracting State as applicable before ICSID tribunals.
76
 It is 
well established that treaties may become incorporated into a State’s 
municipal law and create rights and obligations therein.
77
 An early 
example of this in international practice is the advisory opinion of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice on Jurisdiction of the Courts of 
Danzig. In that case, at issue was whether Danzig railway officials 
employed by the Polish Railways Administration were able to rely on 
provisions of the Beamtenabkommen, a treaty between Poland and Danzig, 
before the courts of Danzig.
78
 Noting that “an international agreement 
cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private 
individuals,” the Court nevertheless reasoned that “the very object of an 
international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting 
Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules creating 
 
 
 72. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 73. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1)  
 74. Id. 
 75. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1993). 
 76. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1). 
 77. E.g., Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15, at 
17–18 (Mar. 3); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829). See also Thomas Buergenthal, 
Self-executing and Non-self-executing Treaties in National and International Law, 235 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 303, 315–17 (1992). 
 78. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15, at 5 
¶ 1(a)-(b). 
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individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts.”79 
To determine whether a treaty has such effect, the Court considered the 
Parties’ intention “decisive.”80 In the case of the Beamtenabkommen, the 
Court expressed the view that the parties’ intention was to create such 
rights and, therefore, the Danzig officials could rely on the treaty before 
Danzig Courts.
81
  
But this possibility is limited by the domestic constitutional orders of 
States and their rules determining the domestic effect of treaties.
82
 This 
suggests the first and main drawback of a domestic-law approach, the 
impossibility of generalization. The domestic treatment of treaties varies 
widely between legal systems. Domestic legal orders are generally 
separated into two broad groups, those where treaties acquire domestic 
status upon ratification, so-called monist States, and those where treaties 
are not incorporated until a domestic legislative act, so-called dualist 
States.
83
 These categories mask broad variation between domestic 
systems.
84
  
Among monist States, there is variety in both the normative rank of 
treaties and their domestic effect. In some, such as Uruguay, treaties are 
treated equally with statutes in domestic law in both rank and effect.
85
 As a 
consequence, domestic courts will recognize claims under BITs.
86
 A 
general challenge emerges, however, because States placing treaties on par 
with domestic statutes usually resolve conflicts according to the lex 
posteriori rule.
87
 If a later statute prevails in domestic law over a BIT, then 
the BIT will not likely be the basis of a successful challenge against a 
subsequent statutory measure. In a federalist context, this is less likely to 
be a challenge if treaties are given precedence over the law of the 
subdivisions. In the United States, treaties are treated as on the level of 
federal statutes.
88
 Treaties therefore prevail over all enactments of U.S. 
 
 
 79. Id. at 17–18. 
 80. Id. at 18.  
 81. Id. at 21.  
 82. CHINKIN, supra note 75, at 124. 
 83. Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 316–17. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 342.  
 86. See Treaty between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 109-17, at 
8 (2006) (noting the inclusion of a fork-in-the-road provision in the U.S.-Uruguay BIT to account for 
the cognoscibility of BIT claims in Uruguayan courts). In addition to domestically enforceable BITs, 
Uruguayan law also contains a statute establishing standards of protection for foreign investors. See 
Ley Nº 16.906, D.O. 20 ene/998 (Uru.).  
 87. Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 342–44. 
 88. Id. at 344–45. 
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subdivisions, the several states.
89
 Even stronger is the position of treaties 
in the Russian Federation, as Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution 
places treaties above domestic legislation in case of conflict.
90
 An ICSID 
Tribunal facing a claim invoking a BIT as applicable domestic law would 
have to navigate the intricacies of the status of the treaty in the relevant 
domestic law to determine the extent to which it would apply in the face of 
a challenge measure that often takes the form of a domestic statute. 
Even if treaties have a favorable rank in the domestic law of a monist 
State, several such States require that a treaty be self-executing in order to 
have domestic effect. For example, in the United States, only self-
executing treaties are applicable ipso facto before domestic courts.
91
 A 
treaty is non-self-executing if it “manifests an intention that it shall not 
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing 
legislation . . . (b) if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or the 
Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation, or . . . (c) if 
implementing legislation is constitutionally required.”92 A further question 
arises concerning whether a self-executing treaty gives rise to privately 
enforceable rights. The commentary to the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States answers this question 
generally in the negative.
93
 This too depends on the interpretation of the 
relevant treaty.
94
 Similar approaches have been adopted by courts in 
Switzerland, Austria, and France.
95
 For example, in Bosshard Partners 
Intertrading AG v. Sunlight AG, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that a 
free-trade agreement was non-self-executing because the programmatic 
nature of its provisions suggested that directly enforceable rights were not 
intended.
96
 Between each of these States, the willingness of courts to 
consider treaties self-executing or having direct effect varies widely.
97
 
 
 
 89. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  
 90. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15(4) (Russ.); 
William E. Butler, Russian Federation, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY 
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 410–11 (David Sloss ed., 2009). 
 91. David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 90, at 509–11. 
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(4) 
(1987). 
 93. Id. § 907 cmt. a.  
 94. Id.; accord Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 
15, at 17–18 (Mar. 3). 
 95. Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 385–90. 
 96. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Jan. 25, 1979, 105 BGE II 49, 58–60 
(Switz.); see also Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 386–87. 
 97. See Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 390. 
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To the extent generalization is possible, the questions of self-execution 
and direct effect raise a second problem. There is evidence in favor of the 
proposition that BITs do not create directly enforceable rights in domestic 
law in the form of a consensus on the international nature of the 
substantive standards established in BITs.
98
 As explained above, even in 
systems where treaties can give rise to substantive rules of domestic law 
without some act of legislative transformation, domestic applicability of 
treaties is often a function of the intent of the treaty-makers.
99
 This mirrors 
the PCIJ’s assessment of the question in Jurisdiction of the Courts of 
Danzig.
100
 A survey of BITs that establish agreement of the parties as to 
applicable law in arbitration reveals a sense that BIT standards are ones of 
international law.
101
  
For example, discussing BITs that do establish the law applicable in 
investor-State arbitration, Gaillard and Banifatemi identify several broad 
groupings of BITs.
102
 First are BITs proving for disputes to be resolved 
according to the BIT “in conjunction with” international law.103 For 
example, Article 7(1) of the Mexico-Switzerland BIT annex on investor-
State disputes provides the “[u]n tribunal établi en vertu de la présente 
Annexe statuera conformément au présent Accord et aux autres règles 
applicable du droit international.”104 The implication of such texts is that 
the terms of the BIT belong to the set of applicable rules of international 
law. Second are treaties that refer to the BIT and domestic law.
105
 For 
example, Article 12(6) of the China-Uzbekistan BIT provides that, in the 
absence of the parties’ agreement, “the Tribunal shall apply the law of the 
Contracting party to the dispute . . . and such rules of international law as 
may be applicable, in particular, this Agreement.”106 Such texts also imply 
the inclusion of BIT standards within the set of international-law, rather 
than national-law, rules. A third group of treaties refers to the treaty and 
international law. For example, NAFTA Article 1131(1) provides that “[a] 
Tribunal . . . shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this 
 
 
 98. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 99. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 383–84. 
 100. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, supra note 77, at 17–18. 
 101. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 27, at 377–78. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 377 (internal quotations omitted). 
 104. Accord entres les États-Unis Mexicains et la Confédération Suisse concernant la promotion 
et la protection réciproques des investissements, Annexe, art. 7(1), July 10, 1995, 1965 U.N.T.S. 269.  
 105. Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 27, at 377–78. 
 106. Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 12(6), Apr. 19, 
2011, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3357. 
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Agreement and applicable rules of international law.”107 Article 26(6) of 
the Energy Charter Treaty similarly provides that investor-State disputes 
are to be decided “in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and 
principles of international law.”108 
Notably, each of the above texts cabins its establishment of the BIT as 
applicable law to the context of arbitral tribunals, even where the option of 
pursing a case in domestic courts is present. This confirms a general sense 
that BIT standards are not intended to become rules of domestic law. This 
sense is confirmed by practice suggesting that legislators and negotiators 
do not intend BITs to be directly applicable in domestic courts. For 
example, the U.S. Senate report on the US-Rwanda BIT notes that the 
substantive standard of protection in the treaty “do not confer private 
rights of action enforceable in United States courts.”109 
This sense is further reflected in the general view that a core purpose of 
BITs is to establish an international remedy for investors in an 
international forum.
110
 Investor-State treaty arbitration emerged in a 
context where investor remedies were limited to political risk insurance 
and reliance on diplomatic protection.
111
 BIT arbitration moves beyond 
these options by being a remedy against the host State (unlike insurance) 
and independently invocable by the investor (unlike diplomatic 
protection).
112
 The centrality of allowing arbitration as a motivator for 
BITs is also reflected in criticism of BITs. For example, the first concern 
listed on the European Citizen’s Initiative website against the Canada-EU 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the US-EU 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is the possible expansion 
of investor-State arbitration.
113
 Such arguments serve to confirm the 
position that BIT rules are often not intended to be ones of domestic law. 
Because of this, it is doubtful whether a jurisdiction whose courts inquire 
into the negotiators’ intent would find BIT standards to be self-executing 
or directly applicable in its domestic law. This poses challenges additional 
challenges in the context of ICSID arbitration, because an ICSID tribunal 
 
 
 107. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1131(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
[hereinafter “NAFTA”]. 
 108. Energy Charter Treaty art. 26(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.  
 109. Investment Treaty with Rwanda, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111-8, at 11 (2010). 
 110. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment 
Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 19–20 (2014). 
 111. Id. at 19. 
 112. See id. 
 113. What is the Problem?, STOP TTIP, http://stop-ttip.org/what-is-the-problem-ttip-ceta/ (last 
visited May 17, 2015). 
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considering a domestic-law-based BIT claim would be forced to speculate 
as to the attitude of a domestic court to BIT incorporation.  
Returning to the first drawback, the challenge of generalization, the 
position in dualist States is clearer. Treaties do not themselves create 
domestic-law rights or obligations.
114
 If there is no domestic statute, there 
is no domestic law claim based on the BIT. If there is a statute, the 
domestic-law claim arises under the statute and not under the BIT. Either 
way, a claim under the BIT is not cognizable in the domestic courts and, 
therefore, before an ICSID tribunal applying applicable domestic law. This 
is of particular relevance to the present inquiry as the States which have 
inspired this article, Australia and Canada, both have such dualist 
regimes.
115
 In both Australian and Canadian law, domestic implementing 
legislation is necessary to turn standards established in BITs into claims 
invocable by investors in domestic law. For the two States most relevant to 
the present inquiry, then, the domestic-law approach to BIT application 
before and ICSID tribunal is a non-starter. 
IV. APPLYING A BIT TO A SUBDISIVION AS INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Because of these barriers to reliance on a BIT against a subdivision as 
applicable domestic law, a theory relying on the BIT as an applicable 
norm of international law may be useful, allow for greater generalizability, 
and offer greater prospects of success.  “[S]uch rules of international law 
as may be applicable” form part of the default law applicable by an ICSID 
tribunal.
116
 This opens the door to the application of a BIT by an ICSID 
tribunal as international law. But this possibility raises two of its own 
challenges.  
First is the question of the kind of entity a subdivision is in 
international law. While commentators and courts have accepted the 
possibility of the responsibility of natural persons, international 
organizations, and even corporations, discussion of whether subdivisions 
of States can be responsible for a violation of international law as a 
 
 
 114. Buergenthal, supra note 77, at 359 (citing MacLain Watson and Co. v. Dept. of Trade and 
Industry, [1989] 3 All ER 523, 544–45 (H.L.) (Oliver, L.J.) and Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), 
[1936] A.C. 326 (P.C.) 347). 
 115. David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis, in THE ROLE 
OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 90, at 17; see also CHERYL SAUNDERS, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRALIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 104 (2011); PAUL LORDON, Q.C., 
CROWN LAW 78 (1991). 
 116. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1). 
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distinct legal person is almost nonexistent.
117
 An ICSID tribunal can hold a 
subdivision responsible for violating a BIT as international law only if the 
subdivision is an entity capable of international legal violations and 
responsibility therefor.  
Second, if a subdivision can bear international legal responsibility, is 
the question whether a norm created by a BIT between States is opposable 
to a subdivision of one of those States before an ICSID tribunal. This 
question has two parts: first, whether a BIT is applicable international law 
in the sense of Article 41(1) of the ICSID Convention; second, whether a 
BIT is opposable to subdivisions of its States Parties. This chapter will 
address each of these questions in turn. 
A. The Capacity of Subdivisions for International Responsibility 
The question of subdivisions’ capacity for international responsibility 
is a threshold issue for an international-law theory of their responsibility. 
This capacity is generally captured by the notion of legal personality or 
subjecthood.
118
 Traditionally, international law has held the parent State 
responsible for the wrongful acts of its subdivisions.
119
 But the experience 
of international criminal law demonstrates that parent responsibility can 
coexist with the responsibility of an individual organ.
120
 Thus, the question 
arises whether, in addition to State responsibility, subdivisions are persons 
capable of being responsible for their violations of international law. 
1. Responsibility for Acts of Subdivisions 
As a general rule in international law, parent States have borne 
responsibility for the acts of their subdivisions. The rule of Parent 
responsibility was already well established at the beginning of the 20th 
century. As Oppenheim noted in 1912, membership in the international 
community as a legal person entails responsibility of the State for its 
 
 
 117. But see Côté, supra note 12. 
 118. ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2010); Jan Klabbers, 
(I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC 
COSMOPOLITANISM 351–53 (2003). 
 119. See, e.g., ARSIWA, supra note 11, art. 4(1). 
 120. See ELIES VAN SLIEDREGHT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 6–7 (2012); see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case N. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 142 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“Under current international humanitarian law, 
in addition to individual criminal liability, State responsibility may ensue as a result of State officials 
engaging in torture . . . .”).  
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violation of international law.
121
 In Oppenheim’s conception of 
responsibility, States are obligated to make reparation for two categories 
of act: international delinquencies and those acts for which the State is 
vicariously responsible.
122
 International delinquencies are “every injury to 
another State committed by the head and the Government of a State 
through violation of an international legal duty.”123 “[A]cts of officials or 
other individuals which are either commanded or authorised by 
Governments” can potentially be international delinquencies, but 
“unauthorized acts of corporations, such as Municipalities, or of officials 
. . . never constitute an international delinquency.”124 Nevertheless, “States 
must bear vicarious responsibility for all internationally injurious acts of 
their organs.”125 Oppenheim’s position is consistent with that taken by his 
contemporaries. For example, a 1900 resolution of the Institut de Droit 
international provides: 
Le gouvernement d’un Etat fédéral composé d’un certain nombre de 
petits Etats, qu’il représente au point de vue international, ne peut 
invoquer, pour se soustraire à la responsabilité qui lui incombe, le 
fait que la constitution de l’Etat fédéral ne lui donne, sur les Etats 
particuliers, ni le droit de contrôle, ni le droit d’exiger d’eux qu’ils 
satisfassent à leurs obligations.
126
 
Today’s doctrine maintains the position that responsibility for the 
internationally wrongful acts of subdivisions lies with the parent State. In 
the words of the ILC in ARSIWA Article 4(1):  
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that 
State under international law, whether the organ exercises 
legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever 
position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its 
 
 
 121. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 113 (2d ed. 1912). 
 122. Id. § 149-51. 
 123. Id. § 151. 
 124. Id. § 153. 
 125. Id. § 157. 
 126. Institut de Droit international, Règlement sur la responsabilité des Etats à raison des 
dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas d’émeute, d’insurrection ou de guerre civile § 4 (Session 
de Neuchâtel, 1900) [The government of a federal State composed of a certain number of smaller 
states, which it represents on the international level, cannot invoke, in order to avoid the responsibility 
that lies upon it, the fact that the constitution of the federal State gives it neither the right to control the 
several states nor the right to require them to satisfy their obligation.”]. 
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character as an organ of the central Government of a territorial unit 
of the State.
127
 
The text adopted by the ILC is clear as to the breadth of the general rule; 
whatever the position of the organ, its parent State is responsible. In the 
ICSID context, this rule has been confirmed by multiple tribunals. For 
example, in Vivendi v. Argentina, the tribunal wrote that “[u]nder 
international law . . . it is well established that actions of a political 
subdivision of a federal state . . . are attributable to the central 
government.”128  
The commentary to ARSIWA, however, reveals scope for subdivision 
responsibility.
129
 The commentaries raise two possibilities.
130
 First is the 
case of subdivisions entering into international agreements as parties in 
their own right.
131
 In this case, the commentaries note that “the other party 
may well have agreed to limit itself to recourse against the constituent 
unit.”132 The second is the presence of a federal clause in a treaty, which 
may limit the responsibility of a parent State for its subdivisions.
133
 The 
commentaries explain such clauses as lex specialis with respect to the 
general rule of Article 4(1).
134
 In each of these examples, parent 
responsibility can be limited with the consent of a treaty counterparty. The 
examples thus reinforce a presumption of parent responsibility in 
international law. Additionally, because both of these exceptions concern 
only the limitation of parent responsibility, they do not speak to the 
potential for direct responsibility of subdivisions when parent 
responsibility remains present.  
 
 
 127. ARSIWA, supra note 11, art. 4(1). 
 128. Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
Award, ¶ 49 (Nov. 21, 2000); accord SAUR International S.A. c. République Argentine, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/4, Décision sur la compétence et sur la responsabilité, ¶ 384 (June 6, 2012) (“La 
République argentine est resposnsable, conformément aux principes du droit internaitonal, des actes 
exécutés par la Province.”); Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Final Award, ¶ 75 (Apr. 30, 2004). 
 129. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with 
Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), at 42 [hereinafter “ARSIWA 
Commentaries”]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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2. Legal Personality of Non-State Entities 
While it is clear that a parent State can be responsible for the actions of 
its subdivisions, the issue of whether international law permits 
subdivisions to be independently responsible for their wrongs is less clear. 
As Oppenheim noted, responsibility is among the consequences of 
international legal personality.
135
 In order to establish independent 
subdivision responsibility, one must thus establish the legal personality of 
subdivisions such that they are capable of responsibility. This capacity is 
generally captured by the notion of legal personality or subjecthood.
136
 
In domestic legal orders, sets of rules on personality usually establish 
what kind of entities are capable of holding legal rights and obligations 
and which legal rights and obligations such entities can hold.
137
 It is thus 
common for domestic legal orders to include either statutes or, in the case 
of the common law, rules establishing a minimum age beneath which 
natural persons are conclusively presumed incapable of criminal 
responsibility.
138
 For example, Swiss penal law establishes non-
responsibility for those under 10, one regime of criminal responsibility for 
those between the ages of 10 and 18, and another for those over 18.
139
 
Similarly, domestic companies law governs when collectives of natural 
persons are independent legal persons with their own rights and 
obligations.
140
 In many domestic systems, such persons, like infants, also 
lack the capacity de iure to be criminally responsible.
141
 These rules of 
 
 
 135. OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 112. 
 136. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 8; Klabbers, supra note 118, at 351–53. 
 137. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 7–9. 
 138. MARK FINDLAY, THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC 32 (1996); Martin A. Frey, 
The Criminal Responsibility of the Juvenile Murderer, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 113; e.g., N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 30 (McKinney 2007) (establishing minimum age for capacity for criminal responsibility); LOI 
FÉDÉRALE RÉGISSANT LA CONDITION PÉNALE DES MINEURS [DPMIN] [LAW ON CRIMES BY MINORS] 
June 20, 2003, RS 311, art. 3 (Switz.) (establishing lack of criminal penalties for persons under 10 
years old); STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], May 15, 1871, as amended, § 19 (Ger.) 
(“Schuldunfähig ist, wer bei Begehung der Tat noch nicht vierzehn Jahre alt ist.”) [A person who, at 
the time of the commission of a crime, is not yet fourteen years old is not criminally responsible.”]; see 
also Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 JUS GENTIUM 35, 39 (2005). 
 139. DPMIN, supra note 138, arts. 3–4; CODE PÉNALE SUISSE [CP] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 
1937, R.S. 311.0 (1938), as amended by DPMin, June 20, 2003, AS 2006 (2003), art. 44, para. 1 
(Switz.) (“Le droit pénale des mineurs du 20 juin 2003 (DPMin) s’applique aux personnes qui n’ont 
pas 18 ans le jour de l’acte.”) [The Juvenile Criminal Law of 20 June 2003 (DPMin) applies to persons 
who are not yet 18 years old on the day of the act.].  
 140. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 7–8; see generally, e.g., CORPORATE BUSINESS FORMS IN 
EUROPE (Frank Dornseifer ed., 2005). 
 141. Susanne Beck, Corporate Criminal Liability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 
565 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014) (Listing “Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Latvia” as European jurisdictions refusing corporate criminal liability). 
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personality are often viewed as “a conditio sine qua non for the possibility 
of acting within a given legal situation[,] a threshold, which must be 
crossed.”142 International law lacks such clear positive enactments 
establishing which entities have which legal capacities, that is, which 
entities are persons or subjects.
143
 International law adds the additional 
complexity that some conceptions of personality or subjecthood entail a 
legislative capacity, either in the power to make treaties or contribute 
relevant practice and opinio iuris to the formation of customary law.
144
 
Because of this complexity, definitions of personality in international 
law vary. Crawford, writes as an example of a conventional definition “[a] 
subject of international law is an entity possessing international rights and 
obligations and having the capacity (a) to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims; and (b) to be responsible for its breaches of 
obligation by being subjected to such claims.”145 But this has not always 
been the case. In order to determine whether designated subdivisions at 
ICSID have reached this status, it is useful to consider how international 
legal personality has opened up over the course of the twentieth century. 
a. Historical Position 
Historically, only States and a few sui generis entities (for example, the 
Holy See and the Order of Malta) were considered to be international legal 
persons.
146
 Writing in 1912, Oppenheim notes that “sovereign States 
exclusively are International Persons—i.e. subjects of International 
Law.”147 The roots of this proposition, however, are much older.148 
Writing in 1758, Vattel defines international law  as “la science du Droit 
qui a lieu entres les Nations, ou États, et des Obligations qui répondent à 
ce Droit.”149 By the early twentieth century, this conception of 
international legal personality was dominant in the doctrine.
150
 For 
example, in his Hague Academy course, Triepel notes that: 
 
 
 142. Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, supra note 138, at 37. 
 143. See PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 9–10. 
 144. Id. at 8–9.  
 145. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 115. 
 146. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 42; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 124–25; 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, §§ 104–07. 
 147. OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 63. 
 148. See PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 35–38. 
 149. E. DE VATTEL, 1 LE DROIT DES GENS § 3 (1758) [“The science of the Law which occurs 
between Nations, or States, and of the Obligations which correspond to this Law.”]; see also 
PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 35. 
 150. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 42. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2017] TREATY BASED CLAIMS 147 
 
 
 
 
Le droit international public règle des rapports entre des États et 
seulement entre des États parfaitement égaux. Les relations entre un 
État fédéral et ses États membres ne sont point du domaine du droit 
international parce qu les États-membres sont soumis à l’État 
fédéral, et les relations entre les individus et les États étrangers, 
ainsi que les relations entre des individus appartenant à différents 
États, ne sont point du régime du droit international public, parce 
que les individus ne sont pas, comme on aime à dire, des « sujets » 
du droit international.
151
 
This conception is confirmed in the judicial practice of the era.
152
 The lead 
example is the decision on jurisdiction of the PCIJ in Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions, the Court’s second contentious case.153 In 
Mavrommatis, the Court considered whether a claim based on a Greek 
national’s grievances against the United Kingdom were a dispute between 
the “Mandatory [United Kingdom] and another member of the League of 
Nations [Greece].”154 The Court held that, by exercising diplomatic 
protection over Mavrommatis’s claims, Greece was “in reality asserting its 
own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its subject, respect for the 
rules of international law.”155 The Court thus upheld the traditional, States-
only conception of personality in a context which now might be subject to 
investor-State dispute resolution under a BIT.
156
 
History shows, and Oppenheim conceded, however, that the traditional 
concept that only States are considered legal persons has never been 
entirely accurate.
157
 Oppenheim himself defended the limited legal 
personality of the Holy See on its maintenance of quasi-diplomatic 
relations with States and its conclusion of Concordats with States that 
 
 
 151. [“Public international law governs relations between States and only between States that are 
perfectly equal. The relations between a federal States and its member States are not within the domain 
of international law because the member States are subject to the federal State, and the relations 
between individuals and foreign States, as well as the relations between individuals from diffferent 
States, are not within the regime of public international law because individuals are not, as they like to 
say, "subjects" of international law.”]. H. Triepel, Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit 
international¸1 RECUEIL DES COURS 73, 81 (1923); see also PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 43. 
 152. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 64–79. 
 153. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Jurisdiction, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 2 (Aug. 30); see also PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 65. 
 154. Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 at 11 (citing the compromissory provision of the 
British Mandate for Palestine); see also PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 65–66. 
 155. Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 at 12.  
 156. PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 65–66. 
 157. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, §§ 63–64. 
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were treated as treaties.
158
 Interestingly, Oppenheim himself allowed the 
possibility of subdivisions of federal States having limited international 
legal personality, taking a pragmatic view of the personality of 
subdivisions.
159
 Oppenheim defines a federal State as “a perpetual union of 
several sovereign States which has organs of its own and is invested with 
power, not only over the member-States, but also over their citizens.”160 
The existence of such federations is based first on a treaty between 
member States and then a constitution, which effectively transforms the 
relationship between members from one of international law to one of the 
newly minted domestic law of the person that is the nascent federation and 
simultaneously defines the respective competences of the federation and 
its members.
161
 To the extent that the competences of members can 
include international competences, Oppenheim argued “the member-States 
of a Federal State can be International Persons in a degree.”162 He styles 
such persons “part Sovereign States.”163 
Oppenheim proceeds to identify two examples of federal States whose 
subdivisions were in 1912 part-Sovereign States.
164
 For example, the 
Swiss cantons were part-Sovereign, and therefore enjoyed international 
legal personality, as a consequence of their capacity to conclude certain 
international treaties.
165
 The German member-states were additionally 
considered part-Sovereign as a consequence of similar treaty-making 
powers.
166
 Thus, in Oppenheim’s view, the maintenance of the legal 
personality of such subdivisions seems to derive from the maintenance of 
 
 
 158. Id. § 106. At the time of Oppenheim’s writing, the Holy See did not yet (or again) govern the 
Vatican City. See Lateran Pacts (Holy See-It.) art. 3, Feb. 11, 1929, available at http://www.vatican 
state.va/content/dam/vaticanstate/documenti/leggi-e-decreti/Normative-Penali-e-Amministrative/Lateran 
Treaty.pdf. 
 159. OPPENEHIM, supra note 121, § 89. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. §§ 89, 108. 
 165. Id. § 89; see Bundesverfassung, May 29, 1874, AS 1 [BV 1874] art. 9 (Switz.) 
(“Ausnahmsweise bleibt den Kantonen die Befugnis, Verträge über Gegenstände der Staatswirtschaft, 
des nachbarlichen Verkehrs und der Polizei mit dem Auslande abzuschliessen; jedoch dürfen dieselben 
nichts dem Bunde oder den Rechten anderer Kantone zuwiderlaufendes enthalten.”) [“Exceptionally, 
the Cantons retain the right to conclude treaties with foreign states concerning matters of public 
economy, neighborly relations and police provided such treaties contain nothing contrary to the 
Confederation or to the rights of other Cantons.”] A. Tschentscher, Switzerland – Constitution 1874, 
International Constitutional Law, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sz01000_.html (last visited Dec. 27, 
2016). 
 166. OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 89.  
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their historical sovereign capacity to enter into treaties that create 
international legal obligations.
167
 
b. Modern Position 
As international law and the actors participating in it have evolved, so 
has its conception of legal personality. As a consequence, international 
law now admits variegated persons having distinct capacities. Categories 
of international person now include, in addition to States, belligerents, 
internationally administered territories, international organizations, 
individuals, national liberation movements, and corporations.
168
 
Additionally, like the domestic law examples noted above,
169
 international 
law recognizes the possibility for these entities to have unequal degrees of 
personality.
170
 As the ICJ noted in its Advisory Opinion on Reparations 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, “[t]he subjects of 
law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in 
the extent of their rights.”171 The question this suggests with respect to a 
given entity is how to determine its international legal personality and the 
capacities that personality entails. The ICJ addressed this question with 
respect to international organizations in the Reparations advisory 
opinion.
172
 In Reparations, the General Assembly asked the ICJ whether 
“the United Nations, as an organization has the capacity to bring an 
international claim” against a government responsible for injuries to a UN 
agent suffered in the performance of official duties.
173
 As the ICJ 
explained: 
In order to answer this question, the Court must first enquire 
whether the Charter has given the Organization such a position that 
it possesses, in regard to its Members, rights which it is entitled to 
ask them to respect. In other words, does the Organization possess 
international personality?
174
 
 
 
 167. See id. 
 168. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 11, ch. 4.  
 169. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.  
 170. See, e.g., PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & YANN KERBAT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC § 30 (10th 
ed. 2010) (“[I]l peut y avoir des catégories de personnes juridiques différenciées . . . .”) [“[t]here may 
be differentiated categories of legal persons . . . .”]. 
 171. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 175; see also G.A. Res. 258(III), (Dec. 3, 1948).  
 174. Reparations, supra note 171, at 178. 
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The Court answered the question with reference to the international 
agreement establishing the United Nations, holding that “its Members, by 
entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and 
responsibilities, have clothed with the competence required to enable those 
functions to be effectively discharged.”175 The Court thus concluded that 
“the Organization is an international person.”176 The Court extended its 
conclusion to the ability to make claims concluding that UN legal 
personality entailed “capacity to bring international claims when 
necessitated by the discharge of its functions.”177  
The ICJ opinion in Reparations establishes that the international 
personality of a non-State entity can be deduced from the intent of States 
in establishing the framework for that person’s participation in 
international affairs. If international personality is thus determined by 
international law and can consist of some or multiple international legal 
capacities, the question remains how to demonstrate that State 
subdivisions have a capacity for international responsibility in the ICSID 
context. An answer to this question is informed by comparison to other 
non-State actors having legal personality and the capacity for international 
responsibility.  
c. Example: International Organizations 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the concept of legal 
personality of international organizations moved from controversial to 
well established.
178
 The story of how this occurred helps clarify 
contemporary conceptions of international legal personality. The question 
of the personality of international organizations first arose in the context of 
the League of Nations. Earlier international organizations, like the 
International Telegraph Union, were primarily fora for multilateral 
negotiation on subjects where international coordination was deemed 
desirable.
179
 The League of Nations was different, both because it 
exercised more generalized activities on its own behalf and because of its 
relationship with Switzerland, which, despite playing host State, was not a 
League member.
180
 Writing in 1949, Wright noted that “[t]he problem of 
whether the League of Nations was a corporate personality, a partnership, 
 
 
 175. Id. at 179. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 180. 
 178. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 120–21. 
 179. Id. at 166.  
 180. Id. at 166–67. 
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or a mere mechanism of interstate relations was much debated and never 
authoritatively settled.”181 Although the League, a corporate entity, entered 
into agreements with Switzerland regarding its activities on Swiss territory 
and supervised the mandate system, consensus never emerged regarding 
its capacity to be responsible for violations of international law.
182
 League 
agreements with Switzerland, however, can be understood in a similar 
light to Concordats with the Holy See, as both were agreements between 
States and non-State entities viewed as creating obligations for both under 
international law.
183
 As a consequence of this capacity, the League must 
have enjoyed what today could be called a limited legal personality. 
The question was forced in a judicial forum by the UN General 
Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion on Reparations.184 The UN 
Charter contains no provision on the legal personality of the UN 
Organization.
185
 But the competencies given the organization in the 
Charter made clear that the Organization would have functions in line with 
an entity that would need international personality.
186
 The case arose from 
the assassination of a UN envoy then present as a mediator on the territory 
of a non-member State, Israel.
187
 Although the envoy was a Swedish 
national, and thus Sweden could have brought a claim against Israel on his 
behalf in respect of any obligations owed to Sweden, but not to any 
privileges enjoyed in virtue of UN envoy status. If such obligations 
existed, they were owed to the UN. As noted above, it was the grant of UN 
competencies such as the ability to conduct international affairs on its own 
behalf that led the ICJ to conclude that the United Nations did enjoy 
international legal personality.
188
 
State and judicial practice regarding the legal personality of the United 
Nations does not stop at the recognition of its capacity to bring 
international claims. UN Members and the Court have also addressed the 
capacity of the organization to be responsible for violating international 
law. For example, Article VIII, sec. 29(b), of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, a treaty between 161 
 
 
 181. Quincy Wright, The Jural Personality of the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 510 
(1949).  
 182. See id.  
 183. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 106. 
 184. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, advisory opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 167–68. 
 185. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 167. 
 186. Id. at 167–68. 
 187. See id. at 167. 
 188. Reparations, supra note 171, at 179. 
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members of the United Nations but not the Organization itself, removes 
claims against the organization from domestic courts and establishes an 
obligation for the Organization to “make provisions for appropriate modes 
of settlement” of  disputes involving acts by UN officials.189 This suggests 
agreement by at least those UN members also party to the Convention that 
the United Nations can be made responsible for its internationally 
wrongful acts. From this Convention, the Court has drawn the conclusions 
that “[t]he United Nations may be required to bear responsibility for the 
damage arising from [acts of its agents].”190  
As a result of such developments it is now clear that being an 
international organization is not a barrier to bearing international 
responsibility for wrongful acts so long as the organization has the 
requisite legal personality.
191
 As Amerasinghe writes, “[o]nce the 
existence of international personality for international organizations is 
conceded, it is not difficult to infer that, just as organizations can demand 
responsibility of other international persons because they have rights at 
international law, so they also can be held responsible to other 
international persons because they have obligations at international 
law.”192 This is reflected in the work of the International Law Commission 
on the subject, which codifies this principle in the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations.
193
  
Developments in the legal personality of international organizations are 
consistent with the concerns raised by the Malagasy Republic and Brazil 
during the negotiation of the ICSID Convention.
194
 The concern raised 
about the effect of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention on the legal 
personality of subdivisions parallels the process by which the international 
community has established internationally responsible international 
organizations. By establishing that some subdivisions can be respondents 
at ICSID,
195
 the Contracting States have shown their intent that such 
 
 
 189. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, art. VIII, 
sec. 29(b), 1 U.N.T.S. 15.  
 190. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, advisory opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62 ¶ 66 (Apr. 29). 
 191. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 182.  
 192. C.F. AMERASIGNHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 239 (1996). 
 193. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26- June 3, July 4–Aug. 12, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, art. 3 (2011) (“Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization entails 
the international responsibility of that organization.”). International organizations are defined as those 
organizations enjoying international personality. Id. art. 3. 
 194. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
 195. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1). 
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subdivisions should have the international personality necessary to act in 
that capacity. Just as the capacity to bring claims was held necessary for 
the United Nations in Reparations,
196
 the capacity to be responsible is 
necessary to subdivisions to be a respondent. 
d. Example: Individuals in International Criminal Law 
International Criminal Law also provides a useful comparison to 
demonstrate how the community of States has extended international legal 
personality to various categories of other actors. Individuals generally 
have gained a degree of international legal personality over the course of 
the twentieth century because of the development of international human 
rights law and investor-State arbitration.
197
 International criminal law in 
particular provides an example of States extending specific juridical 
capacities to individuals in international law. First, an example of the 
responsibility of State organs in the form of individual, natural persons can 
be found in international trials of individuals, where individuals are held 
responsible under international law for their acts. Additionally, the 
example of victim participation at the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
demonstrates the capacity for States to create new forms of international 
legal personality through treaties.  
International criminal law offers a useful analogy between international 
criminal defendants and subdivisions as ICSID respondents. When the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held the first modern 
international criminal trial, its goal was to make State organs responsible 
for acts in violation of international law. As Janis writes, “[t]he Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg explicitly made 
individuals subject to international rules relating to crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”198 Indeed, the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal allows prosecution specifically of “crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility.”199 Answering the question whether individuals were 
 
 
 196. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, advisory opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 180 (Apr. 11). 
 197. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 121. 
 198. M.W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 61, 65 
(1984). 
 199. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, annex, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 288 
(1951) [hereinafter “Nuremberg Charter”]; see also Janis, supra note 198, at 65. 
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persons capable of being internationally responsible, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal elaborated: 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.
200
 
By the time of the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), international opinion seemed solidly to back 
this proposition, focusing instead on the question of head-of-state 
immunity.
201
 For example, in his report on the creation of the ICTY, the 
UN Secretary-General noted: 
[T]he Security Council has reaffirmed in a number of resolutions 
that persons committing serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia are individually 
responsible for such violations. The Secretary-General believes that 
all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution 
of serious violations . . . contribute to the commission of the 
violation and are, therefore, individually responsible.
202
 
However, the analogy with international criminal law is not conclusive. 
There are two difficulties comparing the individuals subject to prosecution 
before international courts and tribunals. The first is the lack of a 
limitation of individuals potentially criminally responsible to State organs. 
The Nuremberg Charter provided that the Tribunal may try the major war 
criminals of the European Axis countries acting in the interests of the 
European Axis countries.
203
 The Nuremberg Charter thus required an 
individual-State nexus to bring an individual within its jurisdiction, to 
make an individual capable of being tried. But developments in 
international law make clear that this limitation is one on the personal 
jurisdiction of the tribunal rather than the type of individual capable of 
being held criminally responsible in international law. As a general rule, 
the Rome Statute only requires that an individual commit acts within the 
nationality or territorial jurisdiction of a State Party in order to be 
responsible before the ICC.
204
 
 
 
 200. Judgment, in I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947); see also VAN SLIEDREGHT, supra note 120, at 18–19. 
 201. VAN SLIEDREGHT, supra note 120, at 19. 
 202. UN Secretary-General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 
¶¶ 52–53, U.N. Doc. No. S/25704 (1993).  
 203. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 196, art. 6. 
 204. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12-13, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
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The second is the distinction between the relationships between State 
and natural-person organ and State and subdivision. As Klabbers notes, 
the act of trying an individual for his individual role in State crimes seems 
akin to piercing a corporate veil to hold a shareholder liable for fraudulent 
corporate conduct.
205
 This, he writes, “suggests that, whatever the legal 
niceties, the behavior of human beings is what matters, and not the legal 
persons in abstraction.”206 This point distinguishes individuals from 
subdivisions. Individuals have a real existence apart from the States they 
serve as organs. Subdivisions, by contrast, do not and are defined with 
reference to the legal order associated with their parent States.
207
 A 
compelling response refers to Oppenheim’s thoughts about the persistent 
sovereignty of subdivisions that predate their federation.
208
 If subdivisions 
are “part-sovereign States,”209 holding them individually responsible is 
within the scope of Klabbers’s analogy to piercing the corporate veil.210 
This response is incomplete as not all subdivisions predate their 
federations.
211
 Nevertheless, international criminal responsibly serves as 
an example of the capacity of the international community to extend 
international legal responsibility to new categories of person by 
agreement. 
A second example from international criminal law that confirms the 
ability of a treaty to create new forms of international personality is the 
development of victim participation at the ICC. Under Article 68(3) of the 
Rome Statute, “[w]here the personal interests of victims are affected, the 
Court [ICC] shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and 
 
 
[hereinafter “Rome Statute”]. Articles 12-13 of the Rome Statute, establish that, unless a situation has 
been referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council acting under chapter VII, the Court may only 
hold responsible individuals who are nationals of Rome State parties or who commit crimes on such 
parties’ territories. This is consistent with the two dominant bases for States’ prescriptive jurisdiction, 
nationality and territoriality. CRAWFORD, supra note 11, at 457–60. 
 205. Klabbers, supra note 138, at 45; see also Sonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1973) 
(holding that the purpose of piercing the corporate veil is “to obtain a judgment against individual 
stockholders or officers, or against other corporations which have received assets without 
consideration”); AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 47 (2015). 
 206. Klabbers, supra note 138, at 45.  
 207. See ARSIWA, supra note 11, art. 4(2) (“An organ includes any person or entity which has 
that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.”). 
 208. OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 89. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Klabbers, supra note 138, at 45. 
 211. For example, while the Belgian State was established in the 1830s, Belgian federalism 
comprising overlapping sets of regions and linguistic communities was developed in a four-stage 
process between 1970 and 1993. See FRANKLIN DEHOUSSE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT PUBLIC § 15.2.1-
.4 (1995). As noted, infra note 253, Belgian regions are active in investment policy and indeed parties 
to Belgian BITs in their own right.  
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considered.”212 Article 75 of the Rome Statute additionally establishes an 
obligation for the ICC to create a framework for victim reparations.
213
 
Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, promulgated 
pursuant to the Rome Statute by the ICC Assembly of States Parties,
214
 
further establishes criteria for an individual to qualify as a victim.
215
 
Victims can include both natural persons and certain juridical persons.
216
 
In establishing the victim category, the Rome Statute sets forth two 
possibilities. First, the victim category shows the possibility of a treaty 
creating a form of legal personality that benefits from particular rights. 
Rome Statute Article 68(3) obliges the ICC to allow victim participation 
and thus gives victims such a right in an international forum and under 
international law.
217
 In this sense, victims at the ICC are similar to 
subdivisions in ICSID, their procedural status before a juridical organ 
having been established by an inter-State treaty. Second, the victim 
category shows that a treaty can provide guidelines for benefitting from a 
class of legal personality. In this sense, victims are again like subdivisions, 
as Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention establishes limitations on what 
kind of entities are subdivisions capable of being a respondent before an 
ICSID tribunal. 
3. International Legal Personality of Subdivisions in the ICSID 
Context 
The examples of international organizations and international criminal 
law have supported several conclusions about the relationship between the 
ICSID Convention, international legal personality, and subdivisions of 
Contracting States. The example of international organizations supports a 
conclusion that States have the power to grant international personality of 
new types of entity and that the competencies of such entities can be 
inferred from the powers granted.
218
 The example of international criminal 
law confirms this conclusion, and also establishes the power of States 
directly to make new categories of person, particularly ones whose acts 
 
 
 212. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 68(1). 
 213. Id. art. 75. 
 214. Id. art. 51. 
 215. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 85, ICC Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr. 1 
(2002); see also Gioia Greco, Victims’ Rights Overview under the ICC Legal Framework: A 
Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 531, 535 (2007). 
 216. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 215, Rule 85. 
 217. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 68(1). 
 218. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.c. 
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might also be attributable to States, responsible for violations of 
international law and to put conditions on the granting of personality to 
new entities.
219
 These conclusions are confirmed by the limited ICSID 
jurisprudence concerning the legal personality of designated subdivisions 
and agencies.  
The most analogous case in this regard is Niko Resources v. 
Bangladesh.
220
 In Niko Resources, an ICSID Tribunal considered the 
personality of two Bangladeshi agencies named as respondents by the 
claimant.
221
 In addition to bringing contract-based claims against 
Bangladesh, Niko Resources brought claims against Petrobangla, a 
Bangladeshi statutory corporation, and BAPEX, its subsidiary.
222
 Niko 
argued that Bangladesh was the appropriate respondent despite not being a 
party to the relevant contracts whose arbitration clauses were the basis for 
ICSID jurisdiction, arguing that Bangladesh was effectively party to its 
instrumentalities’ contracts.223 Bangladesh objected, and additionally 
objected that Petrobangla and BAPEX were not proper respondents, as 
they had not been designated to the Centre.
224
 
On the question of whether Petrobangla and BAPEX were legally 
distinct from Bangladesh, the Tribunal deferred to domestic law, reasoning 
that because “Petrobangla and BAPEX are creations of the legal order of 
Bangladesh[,] [t]heir identity and legal status must be considered first of 
all under the law of that State.”225 The Tribunal concluded that because 
Petrobangla was a statutory corporation with Bangladeshi legal personality 
and because BAPEX was incorporated under Bangladeshi companies law, 
both were entitled to be viewed as distinct persons despite high levels of 
government control.
226
 
Turning then to consider whether the two companies were properly 
designated to the Centre, the Tribunal considered the effect of the act of 
designation.
227
 Relying on the text of Article 25(1), the Tribunal 
considered that the effect of designation was to “enable[] the agency . . . to 
become party to an ICSID arbitration proceeding.”228 The Tribunal raised 
 
 
 219. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.d. 
 220. Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case Nos. 
ARB/10/11 & ARB/10/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 19, 2013). 
 221. See generally id. 
 222. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 
 223. Id. ¶¶ 210–211. 
 224. Id. ¶ 259. 
 225. Id. ¶ 230. 
 226. Id. ¶¶ 231, 235. 
 227. Id. ¶ 277. 
 228. Id. ¶ 280. 
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two reasons for this. First, it cited the Centre’s practice of listing 
designated entities as “competent to become parties to disputes submitted 
to the Centre.”229 Second, it noted that “subdivisions and agencies . . . are 
not normally subjects of international law.”230 It continued, “[i]t was 
therefore necessary for the Convention to provide expressly for the 
possibility that constituent subdivisions and agencies, as entities existing 
under domestic law, could acquire such competence or capacity to become 
party to ICSID arbitration proceedings.”231 The Tribunal concluded that 
“[d]esignation of an agency thus has a very important consequence that the 
distinct legal personality of the agency under domestic law is recognized 
at the level of ICSID.”232 
Niko Resources supports the conclusion that subdivisions enjoy legal 
personality sufficient to be responsible for violating international law, 
such as a BIT. Like Petrobangla and BAPEX, subdivisions are established 
legal persons in the domestic law of their parent States.
233
 Cases like Cable 
Television of Nevis, discussed above, confirm that subdivisions enjoy can 
a separate legal existence in the specific context of subdivisions.
234
 More 
importantly, Niko Resources establishes that the possibility and act of 
designation transform this legal existence into one on the international 
plane such that subdivisions and agencies are international legal 
persons.
235
 Designation makes a subdivision capable of being sued in an 
ICSID tribunal just as independent activities gave the UN the capacity to 
bring claims and qualification as a victim gives individuals a right to be 
heard at the ICC. As the examples of practice confirm, the consequence of 
this procedural capacity is a substantive capacity to be responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts charged against designated subdivisions. 
B. Opposability and Applicable Law 
Having established that subdivisions of States designated as 
respondents under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention have legal 
personality in international law to the extent that they can be responsible 
for its violation, this article now turn to the question of whether a BIT 
 
 
 229. Id. ¶ 280 (citing Designations by Contracting States, supra note 6). 
 230. Id. ¶ 281. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. ¶ 282. 
 233. Id. ¶¶ 231, 235, 277. 
 234. Cable Television of Nevis Ltd. v. Federation of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) & Nevis, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/95/2, Award, ¶ 2.22 (Dec. 16, 1996), 5 ICSID Rep. 108. 
 235. Niko Resources, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/10/11 & ARB/10/18, ¶ 281. 
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creates legal norms applicable to subdivisions as international legal 
persons before an ICSID tribunal. This turns on two questions, the answers 
to neither of which are self-evident. First, are BITs as international law 
applicable before an ICSID tribunal? Second, are the standards elaborated 
in BITs opposable to subdivisions of their States Parties as their own legal 
persons? This subchapter addresses each of these questions in turn. 
1. Applicable Law 
In order for the substantive standards in a BIT to be applicable against 
a subdivision by an ICSID tribunal, they must form part of the law 
applicable in the arbitration. The default law applicable before an ICSID 
tribunal is established by Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention.
236
 While 
some BITs do establish themselves at the applicable law in investor-party 
disputes,
237
 most do not.
238
 As noted above, Article 42(1) provides that 
both “the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute” and “such rules 
of international law as may be applicable” apply in the absence of the 
parties’ agreement as to applicable law.239  The application of a BIT as 
international law thus depends on whether the BIT forms part of “such 
rules . . . as may be applicable.”240 
Historically, this proposition was not a given.
241
 Writing in 2003, 
Gaillard and Banifatemi identify two alternative theories of the role of 
international law in ICSID tribunals which place it in a subsidiary role to 
domestic law.
242
 Consistently with this, in AAPL v. Sri Lanka, the first 
ICSID arbitration where consent to arbitration was based on a BIT,
243
 
relied on the parties’ consent expressed in the pleadings to establish the 
BIT as applicable law making the default choice-of-law provision of 
 
 
 236. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1). 
 237. See supra notes, 102–08 and accompanying text for examples of such BITs. 
 238. Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 27, at 379. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 380. 
 241. See Galliard & Banifatemi, supra note 27, at 381–82. 
 242. See generally id. The first of these is that international law applies “in the case of lacunae, or 
should the law of the Contracting State be inconsistent with international law.” Id. at 381. This 
approach, while initially excepted, suffers from the serious defect of the need to determine whether 
domestic law does (or can) contain lacunae or is inconsistent with international law rather than simply 
addressing a problem differently. Id. at 394–97. The second approach limits the application of 
international law to cases where domestic law is inconsistent with ius cogens. Id. at 400 (citing W. 
Michael Reisman, The Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice of Law Provision and the Question of 
Its Threshold, 15 ICSID REV. 362 (2000)). Gaillard and Banifatemi address this approach by asking 
why the text of art. 42(1) refers to “such rules of international law as may be applicable” rather than 
the category of ius cogens. Id. at 401. 
 243. Nassib G. Ziadé, Some Recent Decisions in ICSID Cases, 6 ICSID REV. 514, 515 (1991). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
160 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:125 
 
 
 
 
Article 42(1) inapplicable.
244
 Central to the majority’s reasoning was the 
lack of opportunity for the parties (the investor and Sri Lanka) to agree on 
applicable law prior to the commencement of proceedings.
245
 This is a 
reality of investor-State arbitration; an investor and a State will rarely 
negotiate an agreement on applicable in a context where consent to 
arbitration is established by the State’s offer in a BIT which an investor 
accepts by filing a claim. Consequently, AAPL highlights the importance 
that a BIT be applicable under Article 42(1) in case the facts of the case do 
not support a conclusion of an ad hoc agreement in the pleadings.
246
  
Through the past two decades of ICSID practice, ample authority has 
emerged supporting the proposition that a BIT alone can provide the 
substantive rules of decision in an ICSID arbitration against a State.
247
 In 
the 2002 annulment decision in Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, the committee, after analyzing the text and history of the ICSID 
Convention held that it “Article 42(1) allowed for both legal orders to 
have a role. The law of the host State can indeed be applied in conjunction 
with international law if this is justified. So too can international law be 
applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other ambit.”248 The 
committee continued to hold in this light that the Wena tribunal did not 
exceed its powers in applying only international law to a BIT claim.
249
 
This approach has been explicitly adopted by several ICSID tribunals 
since.
250
 This practice shows that ICSID tribunals are comfortable 
applying BITs in cases where claims arise thereunder. 
 
 
 244. Asian Agri. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, ¶ 24 
(June 27, 1990). 
 245. Id. ¶ 18-19; see also Ziadé, supra note 243, at 515. 
 246. The situation is naturally different in cases where the BIT contains a provision on applicable 
law to investor-State disputes in its text. In such cases, it seems natural to extend the AAPL offer-
acceptance logic to the applicable law clause in the BIT. 
 247. See El Paso Int’l Energy Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 
¶¶ 132–41 (Oct. 31, 2011). 
 248. Wena Hotels Ltd. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 40 (Dec. 8, 2000); see also Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 27, at 406–07. 
 249. Wena, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 46; Gaillard & Banifatemi, 
supra note 27, at 406–07.  
 250. E.g., El Paso Int’l Energy Co., Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶¶ 132–41; Kardassopoulos/ 
Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18, 07/15, Award, ¶¶ 221–23 (Mar. 3, 2010); Sempra 
Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 236 (Sept. 28, 2007); 
Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 140 (July 26, 2007); Siemens A.G. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶¶ 77–78 (Feb. 6, 2007); Azurix Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 65–68 (July 14, 2006); CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 116–17 (May 12, 
2005). 
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2. Opposability 
But this guidance offered by Article 42 and ICSID tribunals 
interpreting it is incomplete. The text of Article 42 is silent on the 
opposition of the applicable sources of law to subdivisions of States.
251
 
While the substantive rules elaborated in BITs may be within the set of 
rules applicable by an ICSID tribunal, this does not entail that such rules 
bind subdivisions of States Parties to such BITs. This requires 
consideration of the problem of justifying the application of substantive 
international legal norms to subdivisions of States. As Klabbers notes in 
the context of individual responsibility, “[n]o one has hitherto been able to 
explain why individuals owe allegiance to the international legal system, 
and to the extent that explanations have been put forward, they invariably 
arrive at the conclusion that we owe allegiance to international law 
because our states . . . represent us at the international level.”252 The same 
can be said in the context of subdivisions as independent legal persons. 
While some States do include their subdivisions as BIT parties,
253
 most 
federal States do not.
254
 Thus, this additionally requires consideration of 
the interaction between the general rule that treaties do not create 
obligations opposable to non-parties and the relationship between parent 
State and subdivision as distinct, but linked legal personalities. 
Historically, international legal rules were conceived has creating 
rights and obligations between identifiable States.
255
 As Weil noted:  
Traditionally, every international norm has had clearly specifiable 
passive and active subjects: it creates obligations incumbent upon 
certain subjects of international law, and rights for the benefit of 
others. The principles governing the relative effect of treaties, the 
opposability of customary rules, and the capacity to present 
 
 
 251. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1).  
 252. Klabbers, supra note 118, at 362. 
 253. For example, Belgian practice is to include the Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital 
regions as BIT parties. See, e.g., Agreement between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and 
the Republic of Mozambique on the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, July 18, 
2006, 2643 U.N.T.S. 149 [hereinafter “Belgium-Mozambique BIT”]; Agreement between the 
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the reciprocal promotion 
and protection of investments, Nov. 30, 2005, 2646 U.N.T.S. 237. Consequently, for subdivisions of 
Belgium, there is no question of third-party effect. Additionally, such BITs describe investor-State 
conflicts as “[d]isputes between an Investor and a Contracting Party.” E.g., Belgium-Mozambique BIT 
art. 10.  
 254. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 104. Each NAFTA party is a federal State; none of their 
subdivisions are NAFTA parties. 
 255. See generally CHINKIN, supra note 75. 
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international claims reflect this individualization of those owing an 
obligation and those owed a right.
256
 
This is particularly well established relative to treaties, where customary 
international law, the Vienna Conventions, and the pacta tertiis general 
principle consistently provide that treaties do not bind third parties without 
their consent.
257
 The investment protection standards in a BIT create rights 
that benefit investors and grant such investors standing (or the 
international legal personality necessary) to invoke the standards in 
arbitration. The standards are also obligations for the States Parties to the 
BIT. The question is whether the same standards are obligations for those 
Parties’ subdivisions. 
a. Third-party effect of treaties generally 
As a general rule, treaties cannot create obligations for third parties 
without their consent.
258
 This rule finds its origin in both general principle 
and international custom.
259
 For example, considering the question of 
whether Poland could have rights under the 1918 Armistice Agreement (to 
which it was not a party) in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice held that “[a] treaty only creates law as between 
States which are parties to it; in case of doubt, no rights can be deduced 
from it in favour of third States.”260 The Court reaffirmed this rule by 
giving Poland the benefit of this doubt in The Oder Commission, holding 
that the provision of the Treaty of Versailles providing that a convention 
to be “drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by 
the League of Nations . . . shall apply” to the Oder River was not sufficient 
 
 
 256. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 
422 (1983). 
 257. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations art. 34, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.129/15 (not in force) [hereinafter “VCLT 1986”]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “VCLT 1969”]; MARK E. VILLIGER, 
COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 467–68 (2009). 
 258.  See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 227 (2d ed. 2014). Although 
this is the general rule, there are exceptions for treaties which establish regimes applicable erga omnes. 
Id. at 228–29. Among other examples, Aust considers the treaties regarding the status of Svalbard, the 
Suez Canal, and the Turkish Straits. Id. at 229 (citing Convention regarding the Régime of Straits, 
Dec. 11, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213; Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, Aug. 14, 1925, 2 
L.N.T.S. 8; Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, Oct. 29, 1888, 
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/ShowTreaties.aspx?show=1). 
 259. See VILLIGER, supra note 257, at 467–68; CHINKIN, supra note 75, at 25. 
 260. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.) (merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 7, at 29 (May 25). 
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to bind Poland to the later convention without Polish ratification.
261
 
Notably, the Court’s general expression of the rule in Polish Upper Silesia 
is positive, speaking to what effects treaties do have.
262
 Its further 
explanation that a treaty on its own entails no consequences for third 
States is consistent both with the facts of the case and the States-only 
conception of international legal personality then dominant.
263
 
The principle is also codified in part III, section 4, of each of the 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties.
264
 As formulated in the 1969 
Vienna Convention, “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third State . . . without consent of that state.”265 The 1986 Vienna 
Convention repeats the rule, mutatis mutandis, with reference to both 
States and international organizations that are not party to a particular 
treaty.
266
 While neither of these texts explicitly reference subdivisions, 
both are consistent with the general rule against third-party obligations.  
In his third report as ILC Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, 
Waldock considered the rule’s doctrinal origins, particularly as applied to 
obligations on third States.
267
 Waldock identifies two complementary 
theories underpinning the rule.
268
 The first is the general principle pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, a rule derived from Roman law providing 
“agreements neither impose obligations nor confer benefits upon third 
parties.”269 Waldock identifies only one publicist, Scelle, objecting to this 
principle as a theoretical basis for the rule in the law of treaties.
270
 
However, Waldock also argues that, as a matter of custom rather than 
general principle, treaties apply only between parties as a consequence of 
 
 
 261. Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), 
1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 19–22 (Sep. 10); accord Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District 
of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 141 (June 7) (holding that the Treaty of 
Versailles does not bind Switzerland except for such provisions as Switzerland explicitly accepted). 
 262. Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 7, at 29. 
 263. Id.; see also S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sep. 7) (“International law 
governs relations between independent States.”); PORTMANN, supra note 118, at 42. 
 264. VCLT 1986, supra note 257, pt. III, § 4; VCLT 1969, supra note 257, pt. III, § 4. 
 265. VCLT 1969, supra note 257, art. 34. 
 266. VCLT 1986, supra note 257, art. 34.  
 267. Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Third Rep. on the Law of Treaties, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-3, at 17–26 (1964) (by Humphrey Waldock). 
 268. Id. at 17–18; see also Special Rapporteur on the Question of Treaties Concluded Between 
States and International Organizations or Between Two or More International Organizations, Sixth 
Rep. on the Question of Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations or 
Between Two or More International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/298, at 120 (1977) (by Paul 
Reuter). 
 269. Waldock, supra note 267, at 17–18. 
 270. Id. at 17 n.69. 
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“the sovereignty and independence of States.”271 In support of this 
conclusion, Waldock cites several cases before international 
jurisdictions.
272
 In addition to the PCIJ cases considered above,  Waldock 
considers the Island of Palmas arbitration.
273
 At issue in Island of Palmas 
was whether the Netherlands’ silence when notified of a treaty between 
the Spain and the United States purporting to transfer sovereignty over, 
among other territories, the Island of Palmas, affected the Dutch claim to 
the island.
274
 Sole arbitrator Huber considered it “evident that Treaties 
concluded by Spain with third Powers . . . could not be binding upon the 
Netherlands.”275  
Part of the general rule that treaties do not create third-party obligations 
is the exception that they can should the third party consent.
276
 As codified 
in the VCLTs, an obligation can arise for a third State or international 
organization “if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the 
means of establishing the obligation” and the third party “expressly 
accepts that obligation in writing.”277 The requirement of a writing in the 
VCLTs, however, was not present in the ILC’s first draft articles on the 
law of treaties, which instead require only that the third party “has 
expressly accepted that obligation.”278 The records of the first Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties confirm the sense of the international 
community that written confirmation is not required by customary 
international law.
279
 
While international law, be it by general principle or custom, is replete 
with authority against a presumption of third-party treaty obligations for 
 
 
 271. Id. at 18; see also Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l 
Law Comm’n, 18th Sess., May 4-July 19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1; GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. 
No. 9, at 227 (1966) (describing the rule as a “bulwark[] of the independence and equality of States”) 
[hereinafter “Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties”].  
 272. Waldock, supra note 267, at 18. 
 273. Id. (citing Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), preliminary objections, 1959 I.C.J. 
127, 138 (May 26); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)). 
 274. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 843.  
 275. Id. at 850.  
 276. See, e.g., VCLT 1986, supra note 257, art 34; VCLT 1969, supra note 257, art. 34. 
 277. VCLT 1986, supra note 257, art. 35; VCLT 1969, supra note 257, art. 35. The texts of these 
provisions are again, mutatis mutandis, identical. 
 278. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 271, art. 31. 
 279. See generally United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, April 9–
May 22, 1969, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the 
Whole, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/SR.14 (May 7, 1969). The addition was suggested by the Republic of 
Viet-Nam. Id. ¶ 5. In subsequent comments, delegates from the United Kingdom and Brazil expressed 
the view that this was inconsistent with States’ ability at customary international law “to bind 
themselves otherwise than by written treaties.” Id. ¶ 6; see also id. ¶ 7. The South Vietnamese 
amendment was adopted by 44 vote to 19, with 31 abstentions. Id. ¶ 8. 
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States, the position is less clear with respect to other persons. As noted 
above, the international community has recognized the extension of the 
rule to international organizations which now qualify as subjects/persons 
in international law.
280
 Aust, however, draws a distinction between the rule 
as applied to third States and as applied to “objects” of international 
law.
281
 Aust writes “[a]lthough some treaties confer important rights on 
[corporations and individuals], that does not make them third parties.”282 
This concern is difficult to extend to federal subdivisions of States, 
however, which can be seen as enjoying some sovereign prerogatives in 
their own right.
283
 
The dual bases for the rule prohibiting third party obligations arising 
from treaties suggest two different theories justifying the opposition of a 
treaty to a subdivision consistently with the logic of the rule, one based on 
the prior consent of the subdivision and a second based on the relative 
sovereign competencies of the subdivision and its parent State. The first 
approaches the questions from the bottom up, considering the sovereign 
acts of the subdivision. The second follows a top-down approach, 
prioritizing the parent State and its rights to act on behalf of its 
subdivision. 
b. Consent theory of opposability to subdivisions 
One possibility to support obligations on a subdivision under a treaty to 
which its parent State is party is a theory of prior consent by the 
subdivision in their own sovereign right. As noted above, an agreement 
can create obligations for a third party consistently with the pacta tertiis 
principle and sovereign equality when that third party has consented to the 
obligation.
284
 In its formulation of the rule, the 1969 Vienna Convention 
further specifies that a third-party obligation can arise “if the parties to the 
treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation 
and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.”285 For the 
case of non-party international organizations, the 1986 Vienna Convention 
adds that the organization’s acceptance “shall be governed by the rules of 
that organization.”286 These rules when viewed in light of Oppenheim’s 
 
 
 280. See VCLT 1986, supra note 257, art. 34. 
 281. AUST, supra note 258, at 227. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 89. 
 284. See, e.g., VCLT 1986, supra note 257, art. 34; VCLT 1969, supra note 257, art. 34. 
 285. VCLT 1969, supra note 257, art. 35. 
 286. VCLT 1986, supra note 257, art. 35. 
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theory of the international legal personality of the federal State,
287
 suggest 
a view that federal subdivisions consent to treaties their parent States 
conclude by forming the parent State with a competence to conclude 
treaties. 
As noted above, Oppenheim views a federal State as “a perpetual union 
of several Sovereign States” marked by its own organs and a direct legal 
relationship with the citizens of its subdivisions.
288
 In Oppenheim’s view, 
a federation is created first by a treaty between its subdivisions and then 
by a constitution establishing the federation’s domestic legal order.289 As a 
consequence of such a constitution, the federal State is granted the power 
to enact laws binding the subdivisions.
290
 It is typically this constitution 
that establishes the federal State’s authority to conclude treaties on the 
federation’s behalf.291 If such constitutions are viewed as delegations by 
the subdivisions of their erstwhile sovereign capacity to conclude treaties 
to the federal State, then the constitutions themselves represent the 
subdivisions’ consent to be bound by whatever treaties the federation 
makes.  
This consent addresses the logic of the pacta tertiis general principle 
by effectively making the consenting subdivisions parties to the treaty. 
This can be seen by considering the parent State as an agent of its 
subdivisions in addition to a contracting party in its own right. In both the 
civil
292
 and common law
293
 traditions, persons can delegate their authority 
to enter contracts to agents, whose actions create binding contractual 
obligations for a principal. By delegating their capacity for treaty-making 
 
 
 287. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 288. OPPENHEIM, supra note 121, § 89.  
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See, e.g., Arts. 21, 75(22), CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); BUNDES-
VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBl NO. 1/1930, as last amended by 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl No. 65/2012, art. 50 (Austria); 1994 CONST. art. 167 (Belg.) 
(establishing federal power to conclude treaties on matters of federal competence); CONSTITUIÇÃO 
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 49(I) (Braz.); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 32 (Ger.); 
Constitución Política de los Estandos Unidos Mexicanos, CP, arts. 76(I), 89(X), 133, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] , 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 04-21-2015 (Mex.); KONSTITUTSIIA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 72(1) (Russ.); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, art. 
VI. 
 292. E.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV] [CIVIL CODE OF FRANCE] art. 1984 (Fr.); BÜRGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], as amended, § 164 (Ger.); CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [CO] [CODE OF 
OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, RS 220, ART. 32 (SWITZ.). 
 293. E.g., Montgomerie v. United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assn., [1891] 1 Q.B. 370, at 371 
(Eng.) (“There is no doubt whatever as to the general rule as regards an agent, that where a person 
contracts as agent for a principal the contract is the contract of the principal.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 6.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 
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to a parent State, subdivisions effectively make the parent State their 
agent. Because of this relationship, treaties made under this authority are 
opposable to subdivisions consistently with the pacta tertiis principle. 
However, the consent theory also addresses the logic of sovereign 
equality underlying the customary presumption against third-party 
obligations. It is well established in international law that a sovereign 
entity can exercise its sovereignty through its delegation to another actor 
or limitation by treaty.
294
 In Customs Regime, the PCIJ considered whether 
Austria alienated its economic independence by entering into a customs 
union with Germany.
295
 The Court held that Austria had not alienated its 
independence even though the regime required substantial coordination of 
economic policy with Germany.
296
 By establishing or being member of a 
federated State, a subdivision similarly agrees to harmonize its treaty 
policy with the other subdivisions through the mechanism of a federal 
treaty-making power. In doing so, the subdivision exercises its sovereign 
power to consent to the treaty rather than abandoning it. Thus, the treaty 
can be opposed to the subdivision despite the fact that the subdivision is 
not a direct party to the treaty. In doing so, Klabbers’s concern cited above 
is addressed.
297
 Instead of relying on a theory of representation to justify 
the opposition of a treaty to subdivisions, the subdivisions explicitly 
consent to treaty-making by the parent State as a consequence of the 
constitutional order of the federation. 
One limitation of the consent theory of treaty opposability to 
subdivisions is its seeming inapplicability to federations operating under 
Westminster-style constitutions. Absent from the list of constitutions cited 
in endnote 291 of this article are Australia and Canada, whose particular 
designations of subdivisions have inspired the present inquiry. The 
strongest constitutional basis for a Commonwealth treaty-making power in 
Australia is section 61 of its constitution, which provides that “[t]he 
executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen . . . .”298 
This has been interpreted to entail that the making of treaties with other 
States is a federal competence.
299
 In such a case, the consent of the 
Australian states to federal treaty-making can only be inferred based on an 
assumption that the States understood that by ratifying section 61, they 
 
 
 294. See Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) no. 41, at 47 et seq (Sept. 5). 
 295. Id. at 47. 
 296. Id. at 52.  
 297. See Klabbers, supra note 118, at 362; see also supra note 254 and accompanying text.  
 298. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION § 61. 
 299. See R. v. Burgess (1936) 55 CLR 608, 644 (Austl.). 
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delegated what treaty-making powers they had to the Commonwealth.
300
 
The Canadian position is less clear as the Dominion of Canada more 
gradually gained international affairs competence from London.
301
 
Doctrinal sources tend to support the position that the treaty-making 
power is “vested entirely in the Governor General of Canada.”302 In the 
1932 Radio reference, the Privy Council took for granted the power of 
Canada to enter into treaties on Canada’s behalf.303 Four years later, in the 
Labour Conventions reference, the Privy Council left the question 
undecided.
304
 It remains so.
305
 In light of this and similarly to Australia, the 
best argument for the provinces’ consent to federal treaty-making is their 
consent to confederation in the 1860s with an implicit understanding that 
consent to creation of a federation entailed consent to eventual federal 
treaty-making despite the absence of a provision analogous to Australia’s 
section 61.
306
  
c. Sovereign competence theory of opposability to subdivisions 
A second related possibility exists to overcome the third-party 
obligations rule as applied to subdivisions. Under a sovereign competence 
 
 
 300. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION preamble (“Whereas the people of New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty 
God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth”). 
 301. See in re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] UKPC 7, at 3, 
[1932] A.C. 304, 312 (Can.); LORDON, supra note 115, at 77.  
 302. LORDON, supra note 115, at 77; see also HENRI BRUN & GUY TREMBLAY, DROIT 
CONSTITUTIONNEL 561 (4th ed. 2002) (“Au Canada, la conclusion d’un traité international . . . . s’agit 
d’actes relevant de la prérogrative du gouvernement – en pratique du Gouvernement federal, qui s’est 
réservé le contrôle exclusif des affaires extérieures canadiennes.”) [In Canada, the conclusion of an 
international treaty . . . involves acts within the prerogrative powers of government—in practice of the 
federal Government, which has reserved for itself exclusive control of Canadian external affairs.”]. 
The distinction in wording between the two sources hints at the sovereigntist arguments claiming 
provincial treaty-making capacity. 
 303. In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] UKPC 7, at 3, 
[1932] A.C. 304, 312 (Can.).  
 304. Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) 348-49 (Can.); see also Hugo Cyr, 
Canadian Federalism and Treaty Powers: Existential Communities, Functional Regimes and the 
Canadian Constitution (May 2007) (unpublished LL.D. thesis, Université de Montréal), at 114–15, 
available at https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/2644/11957417.PDF; 
jsessionid=58AC2F62C1464DA6AE53FAF5AF98A5C1?sequence=1. The question of treaty-making 
competence arises from the well-established principle that the Crown is indivisible between 
confederation and provinces. See LORDON, supra note 115, at 30. Thus, while it is uncontested that 
treaty-making is an executive power exercised by the Crown on the advice of government, it is less 
clear that Ottawa need be that government. See id. at 77. 
 305. Cyr, supra note 304, at 115 n.209.  
 306. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., preamble, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5 
(Can.) (“Whereas the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their 
Desire to be federally united”). 
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theory, the subordination of subdivisions to a State results in the State’s 
ability to create binding treaty obligations opposable to subdivisions, in 
addition to other non-State actors. The consent of the subdivisions is 
immaterial. As Klabbers suggested, one often cited justification for the 
opposability of international norms to non-State actors is the competence 
of the State to enter into international legal commitments as the 
representative of those non-State actors.
307
 Thus, as Reuter writes, “the 
direct effects of a convention for individuals always derive from State 
authority.”308 This theory suggests that, from the perspective of 
international law, non-State actors are not truly third parties to a treaty in 
the sense of the pacta tertiis rule because States are solely competent to 
make laws (including by concluding treaties) on behalf of the persons, 
natural or juridical, under their jurisdiction. This may be especially true in 
the case of subdivisions which, as noted above, traditionally have been 
considered as subsumed into their parent States by international law.  
This theory is supported by similar evidence as the consent theory. In 
the constitutional orders of federal States, the parent State typically is 
competent to conclude treaties like BITs on behalf of the federation, 
including all those legal persons within its jurisdiction.
309
 As a 
consequence of such domestic constitutional orders,
310
 the only legal 
person with the capacity to make treaties is the State. Thus, as a matter of 
international law, the State behaves as representative for all other legal 
persons within its jurisdiction, including subdivisions. This theory is also 
more easily reconciled with the constitutional orders of Westminster-style 
federations. As noted above, federal treaty-making competence in States 
like Australia and Canada relies on the inherent powers of the Crown in 
right of the federation.
311
 Because the parent State is a sovereign State and 
 
 
 307. Klabbers, supra note 118, at 362. While Klabbers himself seems unconvinced, he reports 
other scholars as being satisfied with this theory. Id. 
 308. PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 101 (José Mico & Peter 
Haggenmacher trans., 1995). However, the mechanism Reuter foresees for accomplishing this is 
domestic law, noting “[u]nder international law, therefore, it is up to each State and its Constitution to 
ensure the correct application of treaties.” Id. at 22. This is the theory of opposability developed supra, 
Part 0, and is subject to the limitations discussed there.  
 309. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 310. Of course, exceptions like Switzerland and Belgium, where subdivisions have limited 
competence to make treaties occur. The sovereign competence theory, however, continues to apply in 
such cases mutatis mutantis. In Switzerland, the question of sovereign competence is resolved by a 
constitutional provision making foreign economic policy a matter of federal competence. 
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 101 (Switz.). As noted, supra 
note 253, the issue of opposability does not arise in the Belgian context as Belgian regions sign and 
ratify BITs in their own right. 
 311. See R. v. Burgess (1936) 55 CLR 608, 644 (Austl.).  
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possesses the powers inherent in that status, the BITs it concludes are 
opposable to its subdivisions. 
An example that supports this theory of opposability is the opposition 
of a treaty to which a State is party to individuals who are organs of such a 
State or under its sovereign jurisdiction
312
 observed in the practice of 
international criminal law, particularly the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The ICC is both established by and applies as law a treaty ratified 
only by States, the Rome Statute.
313
 The ICC “exercise[s] its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.”314 In 
doing so, under Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the ICC applies against 
such persons first the Rome Statute itself and certain instruments 
promulgated pursuant to the Rome Statute, then other rules of international 
law, then general principles of law.
315
 Article 21 thus enshrines the Rome 
Statute, along with its Elements of Crimes, as the penal code against 
which the ICC judges natural persons.
316
 Both of these instruments can be 
amended by the ICC States parties regardless of the content of other 
international legal norms, such as customary international law. ICC 
jurisprudence has shown that the Rome Statute can indeed be opposed to 
individuals.
317
 Among individuals sought for prosecution at the ICC are 
several whose acts would be attributable to a State because those 
individuals are/were State organs.
318
 ICC practice therefore shows that 
international law permits the opposition of treaties to non-State entities.  
Because of this, the ICC example supports the opposability of parent 
States’ BITs to their subdivisions. The ICC has much in common with an 
ICSID tribunal considering a claim against a subdivision arguing 
responsibility for a violation for international law. First, the forum is 
created by a treaty between States.
319
 Second, in neither case is the person 
 
 
 312. See supra text accompanying note 204. 
 313. Rome Statute, supra note 204, arts. 1, 6–8, 21(respectively establishing the ICC, defining the 
crimes the ICC may prosecute, and clarifying that, in the first instance, the Rome Statute is the law 
applicable in the ICC).  
 314. Id. art. 1. “Persons” in this sense means only “natural persons”. Id. art. 25(1). 
 315. Id. art. 21(1). 
 316. Id. art. 21.  
 317. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, pp. 658–59 (Mar. 7. 2014) (convicting 
Germain Katanga of various war crimes and crimes against humanity “under” the Rome Statute); 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), aff’d ICC-01/04-
01/06 A 5, Judgment (Dec. 1, 2014) (convicting Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of war crimes “within the 
meaning of” the Rome Statute). 
 318. E.g., Prosecutor v. al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010). Al 
Bashir is President of Sudan. Id. ¶ 42. 
 319. Compare Prosecutor v. al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, ¶ 1, with ICSID Convention, art. 37(1), 
Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (providing for the establishment of arbitral tribunals by the Centre).  
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charged with violating international law a State. Third, in both cases, 
treaties between States only are offered as the applicable substantive 
law.
320
 The jurisdictional requirements of articles 12-13 of the Rome 
Statute connect the application of this law to the sovereign competence of 
the relevant State party.
321
 The example of the ICC therefore shows that 
international already opposes treaties to persons other than their States 
parties.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Inspired by the designation of several Australian states and Canadian 
provinces as respondents in the sense of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, this article has considered the possibility of treaty-based 
claims against subdivisions. Although no such claims have yet been 
brought before an ICSID tribunal, the possibility is real and stakeholders 
are interested. As noted above, in both the Australian and Canadian 
context, subdivisions typically have considerable assets held in their own 
right, as opposed to the parent State’s right, as a matter of domestic law, 
and thus make enticing respondents to claimants looking forward to the 
eventual satisfaction of an award. The possibility of such claims is also 
real. For example, of the six available final awards against Canada under 
NAFTA Chapter 11, four concern measures taken by provinces.
322
  
Beyond the political possibility of treaty-based claims against 
subdivisions, this article has also set forth an argument in favor of their 
legal possibility. Based on the default choice-of-law provision in Article 
42(1) of the ICSID Convention, two potential theories of applicability 
were examined. Applying a BIT as domestic law and as international law 
are both potential routes to holding a subdivision responsible before an 
ICSID tribunal. Although the domestic-law theory has the advantage of 
the subdivision’s established domestic legal personality, it raises 
challenges of generalizability and, in certain contexts, whether a BIT has 
 
 
 320. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 21(1), with ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 
42(1). 
 321. Rome Statute, supra note 204, arts. 12–13; see also supra note 312. 
 322. Compare St. Marys VCNA, LLC v. Canada, Consent Award, ¶ 3 (Mar. 21, 2013) 
(considering measures taken by Ontario), and Gallo v. Canada, Award, ¶ 121 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011) 
(considering measures taken by Ontario), and AbitibiBowater Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/10/1, Consent Award, ¶ 2 (Dec. 15, 2010) (considering measures taken by Newfoundland), and 
Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, Award, ¶ 27 (Mar. 31, 2010) (considering measures taken by 
British Columbia), with Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 9 (Aug. 2, 2010) (considering federal 
measures), and United Parcel Serv. Of America II v. Canada, Award, ¶ 11 (May 24, 2007). 
AbitibiBowater also challenges a federal measure. AbitibiBowater, ¶ 2.  
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direct effect in certain domestic legal orders. In the context of dualist 
States, including Australia and Canada, a BIT does not have domestic 
effect without implementing legislation. Thus, while a domestic-law 
theory might be an option in some cases, it is not in the context of the two 
States most relevant to this inquiry. 
Turning to an international-law theory of applicability, which would 
bypass the concerns about domestic effect of BITs, three barriers to 
subdivision responsibility emerged. First is the legal personality of 
subdivisions; are they even the kind of person that can be responsible for 
violating international law? International law has developed such that 
subdivisions are as long as States have acted to grant them such a capacity. 
As examples of international organizations and individuals in international 
criminal law show, inter-State treaties can either directly or by implication 
accomplish this. The process of designation has this effect in the ICSID 
context. Second is the applicability of BITs as international law under the 
default ICSID choice of law. As ICSID practice in recent decades has 
shown, this proposition is becoming ever less controversial; a BIT as 
international law can itself be the basis of an ICSID claim, even when not 
designated as applicable law by the parties to a dispute. Third is the 
opposability of a BIT to a subdivision which (typically) is not a party 
thereto. Two related theories can establish opposability. First, the BIT is 
opposable to the subdivision because it consented to it by giving the parent 
State its treaty-making power. Second, the BIT is opposable to the 
subdivision because the parent State is competent to make treaties binding 
persons within its jurisdiction. Authority exists to support both, and either 
theory suffices. Because subdivisions are thus international legal persons 
capable of being responsible and BITs are both applicable and opposable 
to them, subdivisions can be held to BIT standards as international law by 
an ICSID tribunal. 
This article shows that that a subdivision can be legally responsible for 
acts violating investors’ rights under BITs before ICSID Tribunals. What 
remains to be seen is where (or, more likely, when) such claims will 
emerge and how Tribunals will address them. 
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